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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Sources of Information Utilized by California Agricultural 
  
Interest Groups.  (August 2005) 
 
Elisa Lynn Noble, B.S., University of California, Davis 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Gary Briers 
 
 
 Existing interest group theory describes legislative decision-making as a 
communication process whereby interest groups research information on issues, 
combine this information with constituent opinions, and present the resulting 
information to legislators.  Legislators then use this information in developing 
legislation.  The original source of information used by lobbyists greatly impacts the 
interest group’s ability to effectively represent its policy objectives in the decision-
making process. 
The purpose of this study was to identify and evaluate sources of information 
utilized by selected California agricultural interest groups.  This study determined 
common sources used among selected California agricultural interest groups, how and 
why groups choose their sources, the role of trust in information source selection, and 
what purposes interest groups have for using the information. 
Data from this study suggest lobbyists of California agricultural interest groups 
are primarily researching for lobbying purposes.  Lobbyists acknowledged the 
importance of research in their lobbying work.  Specifically, two main themes developed 
from the interviewees’ responses:  1) lobbyists gather the political and technical 
 iv
 
information needed to thoroughly understand an issue before lobbying on it, and 2) 
lobbyists find the appropriate information to support their organization’s policy 
objectives. 
The purpose of their research and the type of information needed drive how 
lobbyists research an issue and what information sources they utilize.  Lobbyists rely on 
their previous experiences to determine which sources will provide them with the 
necessary information.  Data from this study suggest four main factors that impact which 
information sources lobbyists choose to utilize:  1) what information is needed, 2) who 
their contacts and personal relationships are with, 3) how much they trust potential 
sources, and 4) other characteristics of the sources such as accessibility, quality and 
accuracy, brevity and readability, experience of source, current information, 
scientifically-based, sincere, and/or a source that provides needed pictures or graphics. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
 
DEDICATION 
 
This manuscript is dedicated to Dr. William Browne, who passed away on April 
19, 2005 after a long struggle with leukemia.  Dr. Browne made many contributions to 
the agricultural policy and political process research fields.  I discovered his extensive 
studies as I began researching my topic, and e-mailed him in hopes that he could provide 
some insight on my proposed research.  What transpired was a lengthy exchange of e-
mails, in which Dr. Browne shared with me his invaluable knowledge of the subject, 
history of research in the field, areas which required further investigation, theoretical 
frameworks of the topic, and methodology and interviewing advice.  I was immediately, 
and continually, impressed by his enthusiasm for the subject and his willingness to help.  
While I never had the privilege of meeting Dr. Browne, it is evident that he was an 
excellent researcher and an amazing person.  It is for these reasons that this manuscript 
is dedicated to his memory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 vi
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I am thankful to God for all I learned both professionally and personally 
throughout my graduate school experience.  Thank you to my parents and family for 
always supporting me in my goals and adventures, and to my friends for continuously 
offering your encouragement.  Thank you to my graduate committee, Dr. Gary Briers, 
Dr. Richard Cummins, and Dr. David Anderson for offering advice and helping me to 
complete my thesis after moving back to California.  Thank you to Dr. Kim Dooley for 
her advice on qualitative research throughout my design, analysis, and reporting.   
Thank you to the 15 lobbyists who allowed me to interview them for my 
research:  Jack King, Cynthia Cory, Pam Giacomini, Tony Francois, Gary Conover, 
Susan LaGrande, Don Gordon, Roy Gabriel, John Gamper, Mike Falasco, Jack Gualco, 
George Gomes, Rich Matteis, Jasper Hempel, and Louie Brown.  Thank you also to my 
various colleagues in the agricultural industry who offered advice and insight on my 
research topic. 
 There are a number of people who assisted me throughout the thesis-writing 
process.  Thank you to Summer Felton for giving me a place to stay during my thesis 
defense, and to Holly Kasperbauer for her support and friendship throughout our 
graduate school experience.  Thank you to Kathy Reynolds for her encouragement and 
APA-reference reviews.  Thank you to Amanda Plunkett, Tracy Heffington, and Alissa 
Waddell from UC Davis for transcribing the interviews for internship credit.  Finally, 
thank you to California Farm Bureau Federation for allowing me the opportunity to 
complete my graduate studies while beginning a new position with their organization.   
 vii
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 Page 
 
ABSTRACT ...........................................................................................................   iii 
 
DEDICATION .......................................................................................................   v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......................................................................................   vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................   vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................   ix 
 
CHAPTER 
 
I INTRODUCTION......................................................................................  1 
 
  Information Sources Used by Legislators .........................................  3 
  Trust and Credibility of Information Sources ...................................  4 
  Possible Sources of Information Utilized by Lobbyists....................  6 
  Purpose of the Study .........................................................................  9 
 
II REVIEW OF LITERATURE.....................................................................  10 
 
  Definitions.........................................................................................  10 
  History of Interest Groups.................................................................  12 
  History of Agricultural Policy Domain.............................................  15 
  Theoretical Framework .....................................................................  21 
  Lobbying Strategies and Techniques of Interest Groups ..................  42 
  Theoretical Framework and Sources of Information Utilized  
  by Interest Groups .............................................................................  52 
 
III METHODOLOGY.....................................................................................  55 
 
  Research Design................................................................................  55 
  Population and Sample......................................................................  56 
  Measurement Procedures / Instrument..............................................  61 
  Data Collection..................................................................................  62 
  Data Analysis ....................................................................................  64 
 
 
 
 viii
 
CHAPTER          Page 
 
IV RESULTS AND FINDINGS .....................................................................  66 
 
  Issues Addressed by California Agricultural Interest Groups...........  66 
  Defending Issues Versus Asking for New Protections .....................  68 
  Results for Objective #1 – Purposes for Which Lobbyists Use  
  Information and Who Lobbyists Are Most Trying to Influence .......  73 
  Results for Objective #2 – Sources of Information Utilized  
  by Lobbyists ......................................................................................  80 
  Results for Objective #3 – Reasons Why Lobbyists Utilize  
  Different Information Sources and Lobbyists’ Information  
  Finding Strategies..............................................................................  85 
  The Role of Contacts and Personal Relationships ............................  93 
  Objective #4 – Common Characteristics of Information  
  Sources Utilized by Lobbyists ..........................................................  96 
  Objective #5 – The Role of Trust in the Selection of  
  Information Sources ..........................................................................  98 
  The Importance of Research in Lobbyists’ Work .............................  100 
 
V DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS......................................................  101 
 
  Discussion of Findings......................................................................  101 
  Conclusions .......................................................................................  109 
  Implications of Results and Contributions to  
  Interest Group Theory .......................................................................  110 
  Limitations of the Study....................................................................  112 
  Recommendations for Further Research...........................................  113 
 
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................  115 
 
APPENDIX A ........................................................................................................  119 
 
APPENDIX B ........................................................................................................  120 
 
APPENDIX C ........................................................................................................  121 
 
APPENDIX D ........................................................................................................  122 
 
VITA ......................................................................................................................  124 
 
 
 
 
 ix
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE Page 
 
 1 Purposive Sample of Lobbyists Interviewed by Primary Commodities .  58 
 
2 Lobbyists Interviewed by the Agricultural Organizations  
 They Represent........................................................................................  59 
 
 3 Issues Addressed by California Agricultural Interest Groups.................  66 
 
 4 Sources of Information Utilized by Lobbyists ........................................  81 
 
5 Common Characteristics of Information Sources Utilized  
 by Lobbyists ............................................................................................  97 
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 California is the nation’s leading agricultural state in terms of gross cash income, 
value of exports, and the diversity and number of commodities produced.  Gross cash 
income from California agriculture was $29.4 billon in 2003, with export value totaling 
$7.2 billion.  California produces more than 350 different commodities, including many 
specialty crops that are grown exclusively in California.  There are about 78,500 farming 
operations in California, with an average farm size of 345 acres (California Agricultural 
Statistics Service, 2004, pp. 1-3).  California’s agricultural industry and community play 
a vital role in the production of food, fiber, flora, and forestry products for the state, 
nation, and world. 
 As the nation’s leading agriculture state, California is at the forefront of 
legislation and policy related to agriculture.  California agricultural interest groups play 
an important role in representing the agricultural industry and community in the 
legislative decision-making process.  Research claims that lobbyists have essentially four 
roles in this process:  “(1) connect an interest group with government; (2) communicate 
information; (3) persuade; and (4) monitor government activity” (Capell & Thomas, 
2004, p. 155).  Their study focused on the importance of the second role: “communicate 
information.”  The involvement of interest groups in legislative decision-making is often  
__________ 
This thesis follows the style of Journal of Agricultural Education. 
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described as a communication process whereby interest groups collect information on  
various issues, combine this information with constituent opinions, and present the 
resulting information to legislators.  Legislators use this information in developing 
legislation (W. P. Browne, personal communication, April 30, 2004).  The initial sources 
of information (in bold italics below) are what this study sought to identify.  The entire 
communication process is seen in the model below: 
 
Sources of  Æ Interest Groups Æ  Information        Æ      Legislators Æ Favored 
Information        (+Constituent Beliefs, etc.)      Legislation
  
 
(W. P. Browne, personal communication, October 30, 2003).   
  
This study focused on the importance of information in legislative decision-
making.  Specifically, this study sought to identify information sources used and trusted 
by lobbyists of agricultural interest groups.  Previous research (Bauer, de Sola Pool, & 
Dexter, 1972; Browne, 1988, 1990, 1995; Milbrath, 1963; Schlink, 1996) has shown 
information to be the most important resource that lobbyists provide to legislators.  
Milbrath (1963) stated, “the most widespread and tangible service [that lobbyists supply 
decision-makers] is providing information” (p. 307).  While prior studies (Browne, 1988, 
1995; Hamm, 1983; Schlink, 1996; Sulak, 2000) evaluated the role of information as it is 
transferred from interest groups to legislators, very little research has addressed the 
original sources utilized by interest groups.  As the base of an interest group’s argument, 
the original source of information greatly impacts that group’s ability to effectively 
represent its policy objectives in the decision-making process. 
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Information Sources Used by Legislators 
Research (Browne, 1995; Schlink, 1996) on information sources used and trusted 
by legislators is helpful in understanding information sources used by lobbyists.  
Browne’s 1995 study explored the selection of information sources by legislators.  
Browne (1995) recognized that “members use information and sources of information as 
they engage in the tasks of representing people, places, groups, and various levels of 
policy ideas” (p. ix).  Browne (1995) asked legislators about the importance of seven 
possible information sources, including constituents, interest representatives, USDA 
officials, other agency officials, recognized agricultural or policy professionals, news 
media, and professional or technical media.  Seventy-seven percent of legislators 
reported that they selected issues to address based on constituent contacts.  This is 
compared to only 11 percent who selected issues based on a combination of constituent 
and interest group contacts.  In addition, constituents were ranked as the most important 
source for issue selection, determining issue position, trust, overall ranking of 
informants, and seeking out information (p. 111).  Legislators value their constituents as 
an important information source (Browne, 1995; Browne & Paik, 1997). 
 Browne (1995) hypothesized that Congress was changing whom it relied on for 
information: 
The agriculture domain has seen significant changes in relationships between 
information sources and members of Congress over time.  The data set in this 
study show yet another shift in primary informants.  Constituent informants 
appear to be replacing interest groups representatives, just as group leaders 
replaced partisan leaders in the 1920s. (p. 135) 
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Agricultural interest groups have been able to capitalize on this shift in information 
sources.  The members of agricultural interest groups are ultimately constituents of a 
variety of Congressional representatives.  Many of these groups are grassroots-based and 
are able to mobilize their members to lobby their Congressional representatives. 
While constituents were ranked as the overall most important information source 
used by legislators, organized interests were decidedly identified as the “next most 
important” information source (Browne, 1995).  Therefore, legislators reported interest 
groups were a more important information source than USDA, other governmental 
agencies, other agricultural professionals, news media, or technical media sources 
(Browne, 1995). 
Schlink’s (1996) research examined the sources of information used by 
legislators, legislative aides, and lobbyists in the state of Texas.  Her research revealed 
members of the state legislature to be the most important source of inside information 
identified by all three groups.  Schlink (1996) stated “legislators and lobbyists perceived 
working together with contacts to solve problems as the most useful in learning where to 
get information” (p. 86).  In her research conclusions, Schlink (1996) noted that “there is 
a need for an understanding of the process by which information is transferred from 
lobbyists to legislators and vice versa” (p. 82).   
 
Trust and Credibility of Information Sources 
Trust is a key factor in a legislator’s selection of information sources (Browne, 
1995; Milbrath, 1963; Thomas, 2004).  “When discussing the value of informants, those 
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in two-thirds of the offices spoke of trust as a criterion for listening to any information 
source” (Browne, 1995, p. 112).  Interest groups should therefore consider the credibility 
of their own information sources.  Selecting information sources is becoming 
increasingly important as inaccurate information becomes more widely available.  The 
availability of inaccurate data has increased with the introduction of the Internet and 
other modern information technologies.  Milbrath (1963) stated that lobbyists’ 
information must be credible, and that credibility is achieved by supporting information 
with research, data, and science.  Legislators use information that lobbyists provide them 
for making legislative decisions, as well as for their own communications with 
constituents and the public.  “If a lobbyist fails to provide reliable information, …he or 
she rarely gets a second chance” (Browne, 1995, p. 112).   
Often, legislators also seek to identify the original sources of lobbyists’ 
arguments and evaluate their credibility.  Milbrath (1963) found that “[lobbyists] 
generally include research results as an integral part of their presentations” (p. 235).  
Milbrath’s study also showed that all respondents (lobbyists, congressman, 
congressional staff members) rated research very high as an important tactic in 
presenting information.   
Legislators are inherently skeptical of interest groups.  The very term “interest 
groups” suggests a specialized population seeking beneficial legislation.  A legislator 
interviewed in Browne’s 1995 study was quoted, saying, “there is always a risk in 
listening to a lobbyist’s pitch” (p. 143).  Browne’s 1995 research identified three primary 
criticisms legislators had about interest groups:  1) conflict between interest group 
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leaders and their grassroots members; 2) distrust, skepticism of interest groups’ 
nationally determined policy, and interest groups’ inability to explain how their 
proposals impacted others; and 3) lobbyists’ concern only for their personal success, 
versus cooperating to reach a consensus. 
Browne (1995) determined that “no [legislators] suggested that [interest] group 
representatives were dishonest, spread falsehoods, or lacked integrity.  The lobbyists’ 
problems were with what they represented and knew” (p. 139).  Legislators criticized 
lobbyists for not understanding the issues, the local-versus-national dynamics, or the 
needs of members and constituents.  Legislators wanted lobbyists to research their issues 
more thoroughly.  The information sources lobbyists use for research will undoubtedly 
affect their understanding of the issues.  Lobbyists ought to choose their sources 
carefully in order to enhance their credibility and effectiveness with legislators. 
 
Possible Sources of Information Utilized by Lobbyists 
Previous research (Browne, 1990; Salisbury, 1969; Salisbury, Heinz, Lauman, & 
Nelson, 1987) only alludes to possible sources of information utilized by interest groups.  
These possible sources of information include:  1) lobbyists’ interaction with their 
organization’s members and 2) communication between interest groups.  Research 
(Browne, 1990; Milbrath, 1963; Salisbury, 1969) on lobbyists’ interaction with the 
organizations they represent has focused primarily on the presence or absence of 
accurate interest representation, or the occurrence of “farming the membership.”  This 
term, “farming the membership,” refers to lobbyists protecting their employment with 
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the organization by justifying their work to its members (Salisbury, 1969).  However, 
Milbrath (1963) found that “members also serve as important sources of information for 
lobbyists” (p. 205). 
Research involving the communication between interest groups primarily 
addressed the use of coalitions, and the fact that information is most commonly shared 
during collaborative efforts (Browne, 1988; Milbrath, 1963).  Milbrath (1963) also found 
that communication between competing organizations is indirect, but that groups do 
regularly read others’ publications and gather information about opposing groups in 
order to prepare their own arguments. 
In addition to interest group membership and communication between interest 
groups, one can predict that there are a variety of other possible sources of information 
utilized by agricultural interest groups.  Other possibilities include the media, Internet, 
government agencies, educational and research institutions, consulting services, legal 
services, and many others. 
Assuming any number of possible, accessible sources of information, how and 
why do interest groups select their sources?  There has been little research regarding the 
rationale of information source selection and utilization by interest groups.  Browne’s 
1995 work suggested that lobbyists are purposeful in their selection of information  
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sources:  “Agricultural lobbyists and activists are selective about more than just the spin, 
or biasing, they give their information.  They avoid a considerable number of seemingly 
relevant arguments, types of information, issues, and entire public policy decisions” (p. 
xi).  Browne (1995) noted that, “lobbyists’ selective use of information and selective 
attention to issues and policy decisions result from strategic considerations” (p. xi).  
Lobbyists undoubtedly have reasons for the information sources they choose to use.  
However, it is important to note that much of this rationale could be based more on the 
personal contacts, previous experience, and individual research methods of each 
lobbyist, rather than on processes or ideology of the interest group itself.  These 
differences in individual research methods would be considered extraneous variables in 
an experimental study (Gay & Airasian, 2003, p. 358).  However, this study did not 
attempt to identify interest groups by their research methods.  Rather, I studied the 
purposive sample as a group in terms of their methods and selection of information 
sources. 
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Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study was to identify and evaluate sources of information 
utilized by selected California agricultural interest groups.  While there are a variety of 
possible utilized information sources, this study determined common sources used 
among selected California agricultural interest groups, reasons for utilizing various 
sources, and what ultimate purposes various groups have for using the information. 
  
Research Objectives 
The following research objectives were used to accomplish the purpose of the study: 
 
1. Identify specific purposes for which lobbyists use this information  (i.e., for 
lobbying/other political purposes, public education/awareness campaigns, 
responding to various member requests, etc.). 
2. Identify sources of information used by lobbyists and their staff personnel (a 
list of possible sources will be compiled in advance). 
3. Identify reasons why lobbyists utilize different types of information sources. 
4. Identify common characteristics of information sources most frequently 
utilized by lobbyists. 
5. Identify, specifically, the role of trust in the selection of information sources. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
Definitions 
 
Policy Domain
 The concept of a policy domain was introduced by Lauman and Knoke (1987) 
and further expanded by later researchers such as Browne (1990).  A policy domain is a 
subject area within the policy-making process (i.e., the agricultural policy domain, the 
educational policy domain, the national defense policy domain, etc.).  This is the same 
concept that Truman (1951) described as “group classifications” (p. 63). 
 
Agricultural Interest Group 
An agricultural interest group was considered an interest group within the 
agricultural policy domain.  An interest group is “an association of individuals or 
organizations or a public or private institution that, on the basis of one or more shared 
concerns, attempts to influence public policy in its favor” (Thomas, 2004, p. 4).  Interest 
groups will be considered voluntary, lobbying associations typed by membership, but 
representing any variety of issues within the agricultural policy domain (Browne, 1988; 
W. P. Browne, personal communication, July 29, 2004).   
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Lobbying and Lobbyists 
Lobbying was defined as “the stimulation and transmission of a communication, 
by someone other than a citizen acting on his own behalf, directed to a governmental 
decision-maker with the hope of influencing his decision” (Milbrath, 1963, p. 8).  Many 
definitions of lobbying involve communication processes as a key concept; Milbrath 
(1963) stated “all lobbying involves communication.  Without communication, it is 
impossible to influence a decision” (p. 8).  “Lobbying implies the presence of an 
intermediary or representative as a communication link between citizens and 
governmental decision-makers” (Milbrath, 1963, p. 7).  Lobbying was studied as a 
communication process for the purposes of this study.  Also, Browne (2004b) pointed 
out that, “in the United States, lobbying is generally agreed to be a First Amendment 
right, one that can be only minimally regulated” (p. 119).  A lobbyist was defined as: 
A person designated by an interest group to facilitate influencing public policy in 
that group’s favor by performing one or more of the following for the group: (1) 
directly contacting public officials; (2) monitoring political and governmental 
activity; (3) advising on political strategies and tactics; and (4) developing and 
orchestrating the group’s lobbying effort. (Thomas, Hrebenar, & Boyer, 2001, as 
cited in Thomas, 2004)  
 
 
Thomas (2004) identified five types of lobbyists:  “contract lobbyists; in-house 
lobbyists; government legislative liaisons; citizen, cause, or volunteer lobbyists; and 
private individuals, ‘hobbyists,’ or self-appointed lobbyists” (pp. 152-153). 
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Source of Information 
“A source is an individual or an institution that originates a message” (Rogers, 
2003, p. 204).  This was the definition of source of information used for this study. 
 
History of Interest Groups 
Researchers (Thomas, 2004; Truman, 1951) described how the interpersonal 
dynamics of society naturally led to the formation of interest groups.  Truman’s (1951) 
basic theory was that society is complex, and therefore individuals will group with 
people who share their attitudes and beliefs.  In fact, Truman (1951) stated, “in this 
respect all groups are interest groups because they are shared-attitude groups” (p. 33).  
Truman expanded on this premise in stating that norms of society are inevitably 
disrupted, thus prompting people to defend their beliefs.  In order to enact change within 
society, groups of shared attitudes begin to lobby on their own behalf.  In this way, 
shared-attitude groups start functioning as interest groups within society.  In fact, 
Truman (1951) defined an “interest group” as “any group that, on the basis of one or 
more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the 
establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the 
shared attitudes” (p. 33).  Browne (1998) stated, 
interest groups are known by three necessary characteristics.  One, they 
voluntarily bring together members and supporters, or joiners.  Two, these 
joiners share a common characteristic that differentiates them from others.  
Three, the group’s purpose is to represent issues of public policy that fit the 
joiners’ common concerns.  That’s their interest.  Without all of the three, 
whatever an organization is, it isn’t an interest group. (p. 13) 
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 Interest groups generally take on what Truman (1951) called an “inevitable 
gravitation toward government” (p. 104).  Truman (1951) stated, “at various stages in 
their development, interest groups have become political,” (p. 104) and “if and when it 
makes its claims through or upon any of the institutions of government, it becomes a 
political interest group” (p. 37).  This shift to political involvement occurs when interest 
groups can no longer settle disparities amongst themselves, and need to protect what 
they believe (Thomas, 2004; Truman, 1951).  Interest groups then begin to lobby 
governing institutions that have broader power with which to enact change.  In most 
cases, national governments have been the common target of this lobbying.  Truman 
(1951) stated, 
collections of individuals interacting on the basis of shared attitudes and exerting 
claims upon other groups in the society usually find in the institutions of 
government an important means of achieving their objectives.  That is, most 
interest groups become politicized on a continuing or intermittent basis.  In this 
respect, therefore, such organized groups are as clearly a part of the 
governmental institution as are the political parties or the branches formally 
established by law or constitution. (p. 502) 
 
Truman (1951) discussed interest groups as an integral part of the governmental 
process.  Because, he claimed, everyone has interests that they will share with some 
people and not share with others: 
Whether we look at an individual citizen, at the executive secretary of a trade 
association, at a political party functionary, at a legislator, administrator, 
governor, or judge, we cannot describe his participation in the governmental 
institution, let alone account for it, except in terms of the interests with which he 
identifies himself and the groups with which he affiliates and with which he is 
confronted. (p. 502) 
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It makes sense that people would attempt to effect change by joining with like-minded 
individuals and attempting to influence government as a group. 
Most interest groups have two main purposes:  1) providing benefits to their 
members, and 2) lobbying on behalf of their members.  Browne (1988) discussed the 
challenge interest groups face in balancing lobbying efforts with providing member 
services.  Member-driven interest groups are ultimately supported and at the will of their 
members.  Therefore, “lobbying, when it is necessary, usually results from an extension 
of an organization’s broadly defined purpose, including services, rather than from a 
desire to be the best lobby in Washington” (Browne, 1988, p. 23).  Nownes, 
Baumgartner, and Leech (2004) identified six major developments that have occurred in 
the interest group universe since the 1960s:  “the proliferation of interests, the 
dominance of business and occupational interests, the rise of public interest groups, the 
expansion of corporate activity, the rise of institutional interests, and the rise of political 
action committees (PACs)” (pp. 115-117). 
 In addition to interest groups, there are a variety of other influences involved in 
the policy-making process.  Salisbury (1984) discussed the “dominance of institutions,” 
including entities such as “individual corporations, state and local governments, 
universities, think tanks, and most other institutions of the private sector” (p. 64).  
Salisbury distinguished between these “institutions” and “membership or purposive 
groups” (p. 75), and discussed the advantages and disadvantages of each in the political 
environment.  While these institutions are different from the membership-based interest 
groups studied in this research, they do play a role in the policy-making process.  It is 
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important to note this distinction here, as the influence of institutions also affects how 
interest groups operate. 
 Thomas (2004) stated that “in addition to promoting the political interests of their 
members or organization, interest groups perform several important functions for 
political systems” (p. 10).  These included, “aggregation and representation of interests, 
facilitating government, political education and training, candidate and public official 
recruitment, sources of campaign finance and sources of political party electoral 
support” (Thomas, 2004, pp. 10-11). 
 
History of Agricultural Policy Domain 
Lauman and Knoke (1987) discussed interest group theory in the context of 
“policy domains.”  Instead of investigating each group in relation to the entire interest 
group lobby, they suggested evaluating groups within their “policy domain level.”  In 
other words, groups should be analyzed in context of the issues they address, or within 
subject areas.  Examples of policy domains include agriculture, education, energy, health 
care, defense, and labor, among others. 
The agricultural policy domain has grown and diversified over time.  Truman 
(1951) discussed the formation of farm organizations, describing them as “a bewildering 
array of interdependent movements” and “a succession of movements of national scope” 
(p. 87).  Most farm organizations organized around interests in various commodities.  
Truman distinguishes between agricultural associations and trade associations, but 
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recognized that most agricultural associations operate like trade associations or are 
affiliated with a similar type of business group. Truman (1951) stated,  
the best over-all picture of farm associations, however, can be drawn from the 
successive development of three national organizations that are still operating, 
the National Grange Order of the Patrons of Husbandry, the Farmers’ 
Educational and Co-operative Union, and the American Farm Bureau Federation.  
All three emerged out of the increased interactions of farmers in response to 
intense disturbances of their accustomed behavior. (p. 87)   
 
Browne (1988) discussed four “policy types” of private agricultural interest groups:  “1) 
agrarian protest groups, 2) multipurpose organizations, 3) single-issue organizations, and 
4) single-project organizations” (p. 58).  All such farm lobby groups are seeking 
favorable policy for their farmer members. 
Over the years there have been a wide variety of societal disturbances that have 
prompted farm organizations to organize and to act.  After the Civil War, commercial 
farming spread throughout the North and the West, causing many changes in the way 
farmers did business.  Truman (1951) observed, 
the accompanying specialization [of commercial farming] exposed farmers to the 
unpredictable insecurities stemming from changes in the market, accentuated by 
the discriminatory practices of the railroads and by various speculative activities.  
By the 1870’s the farmers of both East and West found themselves dependent 
upon the vagaries of marketing institutions, transportation facilities, and prices. 
(pp. 87-88) 
 
In this way, many farm organizations began as farmer rebellions and protest groups 
(Browne, 1988, 2004; Cigler & Hansen, 1983; McConnell, 1953; Truman, 1951).  
McConnell (1953) pointed out that until about the 1950’s, farmers had been the 
majority; so, much of the farmer protest movements grew out of a shift in power and the 
rise in capitalism.  Also, “the great farmer movements of the nineteenth century….were 
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made not merely against injustice to farmers but against injustice to all common men.  
Agrarianism spoke in the name of all.  The enemy which it challenged was power” (p. 
1). 
Browne and Lundgren (1987) and Cigler and Hansen (1983) discussed why farm 
protest groups often are not sustained over time.  Unless protest groups begin offering 
member services, they often disband once their primary issue is addressed or ignored.  
As Cigler and Hansen stated, “economic hard times may spawn new interest groups, but 
they cannot sustain them” (p. 103).  The original grassroots farmer movements that 
survived became more politicized and eventually moved their efforts to Washington as 
the need grew to be seen and heard at the nation’s capital.  McConnell (1953) stated, 
“whether by seeking control of a state legislature or a congressional district, or merely 
by sending letters to Congress to ask for increased appropriations for country roads, 
most farm organizations have acted politically” (p. 145).  Today’s agricultural 
organizations are still politically motivated by many of the same types of issues that first 
initiated their organizations. 
 However, Browne (1988) pointed out that agricultural policy no longer entails 
just farm policy, or basic farm maintenance.  The growth and diversification of the 
agricultural policy domain has led to a complex array of issues that affect and include 
many other segments of society.  Now, “issues of nutrition, safety, quality, and domestic 
assistance have become institutionalized in agriculturally related legislation” (Browne, 
1995, p. 3).  Much of this is also due to the sheer growth in the number of lobbyists 
involved in the policy making process.  “The number of registered lobbyists, including 
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part-timers and non-Washingtonians, more than doubled between 1976 and 1986 – from 
3,420 to 8,800.  Approximately 20 to 25 percent of these lobbyists represented some 
type of farm, food, fiber, or related trade issue” (Browne, 1988, p. 7).  Baumgartner and 
Leech (1998), in their review of interest groups listed in the Encyclopedia of 
Associations, reported that “the total number of interest groups [increased] from fewer 
than 6,000 in 1959 to more than 23,000 in 1995” (p. 102). 
 Browne (1988) explained why agricultural policy involves so many aspects of 
society: 
Although fewer than 3 percent of U.S. residents work on farms, nearly one in 
five workers is involved in some facet of farm production and supply or food and 
fiber distribution and service.  Workers involved in these enterprises contributed 
17.9 percent of the gross national product for 1984….Defined this way, the 
agricultural lobby represents most economic and social interests. (p. 4) 
 
There are many competing interests within the agricultural policy domain.  Some 
of these competing interests are stereotypical, such as environmental groups versus 
production farm groups.  However, the complexity of issues within the agricultural 
policy domain creates divisions even between historical farm production groups.  
Differences in policy positions are especially evident between general farm 
organizations and specific commodity groups.  Browne (1988) stated, 
the intensive policy focus of the commodity groups displaced in importance the 
more diffuse demands of the general farm organizations.  The heterogeneous 
memberships of the Farm Bureau and the Farmers Union apparently produce a 
variety of viewpoints, competing interests, a larger number of issues, and greater 
difficulty in compromise.  Corn farmers or wheat growers can more easily 
coalesce around basic commodity programs. (p. 9) 
 
Farm programs are one of the primary issues within the entire agricultural policy 
domain.  Support for farm programs, especially subsidies, has been a contentious issue 
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for many years.  Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe (1999) argued that these support programs 
are a result of “macroeconomic and macropolitical events – such as the Great Depression 
or the Second World War – that can induce large, discontinuous changes in policy 
regimes” (p. 51).  Once policy has been established and maintained over a period of 
time, it is much more difficult to reform.  Such is the case, Orden et al. argued, with farm 
support programs.  “It is easier for organizations to defend programs in existence than to 
create new ones, because it is easier to motivate political action to preserve tangible 
benefits that are already being received” (Orden et al., 1999, p. 52).  Browne (1988) 
agreed that the Depression era was the climax of specific support afforded farmers 
through agricultural policy.  Browne (1988) also noted, “farmers had been identified by 
a wide spectrum of observers as special in their social, political, and economic 
importance” (p. 238).  Browne (1988) elaborated on the numerous volatile conditions 
that created instability for the farmer.  The presence of these conditions initiated 
government intervention in the form of marketplace regulations and farm support 
programs.   
The multiplication of agricultural interest groups has caused these groups to 
focus on specific issues or policy priorities.  Browne (1990, 1998) discussed this trend as 
the developing of “issue niches” by agricultural interest groups.  Each agricultural 
interest group typically has a few very specific policy goals they are lobbying each 
legislative session.  This has created a “new universe of organized interests,” as Browne 
(1988, p. 249) described it.  Browne (1988) claimed the agricultural policy domain “has 
grown into one of a great many specialized interests, most of which are not regular 
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policy players, organized around highly specific goals” (p. 249).  This environment has 
made it difficult for agricultural interest groups to present a united front for 
comprehensive agricultural policy reform.  As Browne (1988) stated, “farmers are 
troubled, in the main, by their own representatives’ collective inability to resolve their 
differences about the direction agricultural policy should take” (p. 251).  The agricultural 
lobby has created some unique challenges for itself, as groups with varying policy 
priorities simultaneously attempt to influence the legislative process. 
Different organizations have different lobbying priorities based on their 
membership. “Groups move politically to protect what they know members value” 
(Browne, 1988, p. 24).  This member-driven political action of individual agricultural 
organizations has often caused a lack of consensus amongst the agricultural lobby as a 
whole.  In fact, “lobbying in agriculture is often said by policymakers to be uneven, 
biased, inconsistent, hit-or-miss, inattentive to detail, unconcerned with major issues, 
and too incremental” (Browne, 1988, p. 24).  American agriculture is a complex system 
that involves many levels of transportation, processing, packaging, and distributing 
before products harvested on the farm reach the end consumer.  In addition, there are 
many local, state, and federal laws and regulations that affect each step of this process.  
This complexity of issues combined with the membership goals of individual 
organizations often creates a lack of uniform policy objectives across the agricultural 
policy domain. 
The origins of the agricultural policy domain, its evolution over time, and the 
diversity of interests that it represents today provide an excellent foundation from which 
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to study interest group theory (Browne, 1988, 2004a).  “Scholars have frequently used 
agriculture-based explanations in generalizing about American politics, especially in the 
area of interest groups” (Browne, 1988, p. xii).  Much historical research regarding 
interest group theory has been conducted within the agricultural policy domain. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
There exists a variety of theories regarding the role of interest groups in the 
policy making process.  These theories provide the theoretical framework from which to 
study the legislative decision-making process.  Key theories discussed include elitism 
versus pluralism, the iron triangle concept, group theory, exchange theory, transactional 
theory, and lobbying as a communication process.  Finally, I examined how these 
theories impact the strategies and techniques of interest groups in the policy making 
process. 
 
Elitism versus Pluralism 
Theory regarding interest groups involves two primary schools of thought: 
elitism and pluralism (Browne, 1990; Dahl, 1961; Jordan, 2004; Polsby, 1963; 
Schattschneider, 1960).  Achievement of the pluralist theory is dependent on all interest 
groups having the knowledge and ability to represent themselves in the decision-making 
process (Dahl, 1961).  Conversely, the elitism theory suggests that a select group of 
political interests have ultimate influence on the legislative decision-making process, and 
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therefore pluralism (or equal representation of all interest groups) is not possible 
(Schattschneider, 1960). 
Pluralism would enhance the quality of the flow of communication in the 
legislative decision-making process because all interest groups would be represented.  
While elitism might expedite the flow of information, it would not allow for complete 
representation of all interest groups.   
The sources of information that interest groups utilize in acquiring knowledge 
and developing legislative positions can greatly impact the adequate representation and 
ultimate success of these groups.  This research does not intend to prove or disprove 
either the pluralism or elitism theory.  However, the sources of information that interest 
groups have access to and the reasons why they choose some sources over others affect 
the success of pluralism, elitism, or any combination of the two theories.     
Original pluralist theory claimed that pluralism was achieved when a large 
number of different interest groups were involved in the decision-making process 
(Browne, 1990; Dahl, 1961).  This theory is extrapolated to mean that numerous policy 
options would develop and effectively create an environment of pluralism.  However, 
researchers (Jordan, 2004; Polsby, 1963; Schattschneider, 1960) have repeatedly argued 
this claim.  Elitism theory proposes that true pluralism is simply not possible.  
Researchers (Jordan, 2004; Polsby, 1963; Schattschneider, 1960) claim that the inherent 
nature of politics does not allow for true equal representation of all interests in the 
legislative decision-making process.  Therefore, a social, economic, and political elite 
dictate the actions of legislators and the outcomes of legislation. 
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 There are certainly flaws in both theories.  Pluralism is a more idealistic theory, 
while elitism is the more pessimistic theory.  Many researchers (Browne, 1990; Jordan, 
2004; Lauman & Knoke, 1987; Salisbury, 1984) question the pluralist theme due to its 
complexity and idealistic nature.  The pluralist interest group theory is called into 
question on two primary accounts: the lack of true representation of all interest groups in 
the decision-making process (external) and the lack of true membership-driven policy 
positions of these interest groups (internal).  Elitism, on the other hand, is increasingly 
challenged by the information age and the vast amount of knowledge and information 
that is available.  This access to information undoubtedly increases the knowledge and 
enhances the representation of interest groups.  In addition, Salisbury (1969) stated, 
“over time there will appear more and more different, diverse, specialized groups in the 
political arena as the processes of social fission continue” (pp. 4-5).  More available 
knowledge and a continuing proliferation of interest groups allow legislators to be made 
aware of more possible policy ideas.  These factors provide the environment necessary 
for pluralism to be realized.   
The elitism/pluralism debate of interest group theory has become more complex 
as researchers (Browne, 1988; Jordan, 2004; Lauman & Knoke, 1987) have accounted 
for the many and changing dynamics of the legislative decision-making process.  For 
example, Lauman and Knoke (1987) introduced the term, “elite interest group pluralism” 
in their attempt to more accurately describe interest group theory and the decision-
making process (p. 377).  The concept of elite interest group pluralism is based on the 
notion that true fragmentation of interests among all possible groups does not exist.  
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However, this fragmentation of interests which facilitates pluralism is found among the 
most powerful, or elite, interest groups.  Other variations of the pluralism theory include 
neopluralism, reformed pluralism, critical pluralism, and anti-pluralism (Jordan, 2004).    
Browne’s (1990) research supports a political environment of “organized 
interests and their issue niches” (p. 477).  Browne (1990) contends that interest groups 
identify issue niches in order to pursue clearly identifiable goals and avoid conflict with 
competing groups.  This organizational structure supports the notion of pluralism 
through a new line of reasoning.  Browne (1990) defends pluralism on the premise that 
pluralist theory is attained by the fragmentation and interactive negotiation that occurs 
between interest groups.  In other words, while each and every group may not be directly 
represented on Capitol Hill, their interests will still be represented through another group 
or by another means.  Consequently, the pluralist theory of equal representation is 
maintained.  “In this way, the ideas that are valued – if not actively promoted – by all 
citizens can come into play as government makes decisions under interest-group 
pressure” (Browne, 1990, p. 479). 
Interests represented in the agricultural policy domain have increased and 
diversified immensely over the past 30 years.  As a result, most current research 
(Browne, 1988, 1990; Jordan, 2004) supports a form of the pluralistic theory: 
The resulting proliferation of groups, both in number and type, has brought a 
multifaceted lobby with widely varying points of view to agricultural 
policymaking.  Because critical views – if not active lobbying efforts – confront 
one another regularly, a form of pluralistic representation that has not been 
present since the 1920s has been restored to agricultural policymaking. (Browne, 
1988, p. 250) 
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Pluralism theory refutes the idea that American government is simply a “pressure-group-
driven model” (Browne, 1988, p. 252).  Elitism is rejected because narrow special 
interests are not responsible for all policy initiatives.  Browne (1988) stated, “even the 
most established interests operate in a setting in which key policy initiatives originate 
from many sources” (p. 213).   
The complexity of the legislative process combined with the diversity of interest 
groups involved supports the basic concept of pluralism in today’s policy-making 
process.  However, Jordan (2004) pointed out that “pluralism as a practical system 
cannot deliver satisfactory outcomes for all interest groups” (p. 46).  In other words, the 
existence of pluralism does not guarantee that all interest groups will achieve their 
objectives all the time.  What it does guarantee is that all interests will be represented 
throughout the process.  Jordan (2004) went on to explain, “even the promise that 
different views can be addressed given time is little compensation for frustrated 
organizations, as there is no guarantee that their political position will improve in an 
acceptable period of time” (p. 47).  Pluralist theory does not suggest that all interests will 
win; rather, it suggests that all interests will contribute to policy outcomes.  
 
The Iron Triangle Concept 
The iron triangle concept claims that the collective negotiations of three entities 
control all policy outcomes.  These three entities are legislative committees, government 
regulatory agencies, and interest groups (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Browne, 1995, 
2004; Gais, Peterson, & Walker, 1984; Hamm, 1983; Hardin, 1978; Knott & Miller, 
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1987; Rourke, 1976; Thomas, 2004).   In discussing agricultural price policy, Hardin 
(1978) stated,  
like much other American policy, [it] has been strongly influenced by what I 
shall call bureaucracy and others call ‘the triangle of power,’ or ‘political 
subsystem’….bureaucracies are found in centers of semi-independent power that 
arise in certain agencies plus the strategic legislators, committee chairmen 
usually, plus the affected and organized interests. (p. 467) 
 
The iron triangle concept is described by other terms such as “’whirlpools’, ‘cozy 
triangles’, ‘subgovernments’, [and] ‘subsystems’” (Hamm, 1983, p. 380). 
Legislative committees provide a forum for comprehensive debate on specific 
policy topics.  Many key policy decisions are made in committees where there is more 
time to consider each piece of legislation.  Legislative committees are an important 
venue through which lobbyists pursue their political goals.  In exchange, interest groups 
provide the financial and electoral support legislators need (Browne, 1995).  Therefore, 
it behooves legislator committee members to listen to and consider the requests of these 
constituency groups. 
Governmental regulatory agencies are, by law, neutral entities whose purpose is 
to implement the laws passed by the legislature.  However, many political scientists 
argue that these agencies are in fact actively involved in the political process.  “Agencies 
provide channels of ‘access’ through which segments of the public can advance or 
protect their interests in the executive branch in much the same way as they pursue their 
goals through other governmental institutions” (Rourke, 1976, p. 1).  Cooperation with a 
well-organized constituency, such as an interest group, can help these agencies achieve 
their policy goals.  Unfortunately, this can cause the intended consumers of the agencies’ 
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services to be neglected.  Agencies can establish a power base by serving interest group 
constituencies.  Rourke (1976) observed, “strength in a constituency is no less an asset 
for an American administrator that it is for a politician, and some agencies have 
succeeded in building outside support as formidable as that of any political organization” 
(p. 42).  In return for supporting agencies, interest groups receive more lenient 
interpretations of laws, less regulation, and fewer fees and fines.  This cooperation that 
interest groups receive from agencies is sometimes termed “agency capture.”  
Regulatory agencies also cooperate with legislative committees by providing policy 
options and execution in exchange for funding and political support. 
  As well-organized groups of constituents and consumers, interest groups clearly 
have some clout with both regulatory agencies and legislative committees.  In return, 
interest groups are expected to support regulatory agencies in their policy goals, and 
support legislators and committee staff with electoral and financial support. 
 Browne (1995) claimed that the power of the agriculture committees is primarily 
due to the integrated support from interest groups and the USDA.  Browne admitted his 
observations support the iron-triangle theory of political decision-making.  Orden et al. 
(1999) also noted the role of the iron triangle in supporting farm policy:   
It is thus not surprising to find the Agriculture Committees of Congress and the 
USDA often working in conjunction with the leaders of farm organizations to 
keep the government programs in place.  The three-sided nexus (farm lobbyists, 
congressional Agriculture Committees, and the USDA) that so often works to 
perpetuate existing farm programs has traditionally been described as an ‘iron 
triangle’. (p. 53) 
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While Browne (1986, 1995, 1998) acknowledged the historical concept of the 
iron triangle theory, he goes on to refute the theory and claim it as not feasible in today’s 
policy arena.  “The response to constituent demands in an already crowded universe of 
policy activists explodes the iron triangle metaphor.  Neither that metaphor nor any of its 
extensions are any longer appropriate analytical tools for summarizing complex political 
relationships” (Browne, 1995, p. 134).  This claim corresponds well with the increasing 
growth and diversity of the agricultural policy domain.  Gais et al. (1984) agreed that, 
“there may never have been a period when the American political system was organized 
around a pervasive set of politically autonomous iron triangles” (p. 182).  Browne (1986) 
stated, “As a cozy iron triangle, the decisional structure [of agricultural politics] has been 
outgrown rather than broken” (p. 197).  Even if these iron triangle interactions don’t 
occur, there are undoubtedly relationships between legislative committees, regulatory 
agencies, and interest groups that impact the policy-making process. 
 
Group Theory 
 
 The basis of group theory is that individuals cannot be understood apart from 
their association with others (Hayes, 1986; Latham, 1952; Mohr, 1973; Olson, 1965; 
Truman, 1951).  Society itself is associational, or comprised of groups.  These groups 
have many internal and external dynamics, both of which are constantly changing.  The 
internal dynamics consist of the structure of groups: who is in leadership, and who is 
being led.  The external dynamics involve groups interacting with their environments 
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and with other groups.  Simple groups typically become more complex the longer they 
operate within their environments.     
 Groups provide individuals a forum to express their values.  Latham (1952) said, 
“the chief social values cherished by individuals in modern society are realized through 
groups” (p. 1).  The purpose of group organization is the security and representation of 
the group’s members.  By their very nature, groups contain a concentration of human 
resources.  It is primarily the grouping of these resources that allows groups to exert 
themselves in society.  Latham (1952) stated, “self-expression and security, ideology and 
interest, are sought by the group members through control of the physical and social 
environment which surround each group, and in the midst of which it dwells” (p. 29). 
 “Official groups” within society are entities such as the legislature, regulatory 
agencies, registered organizations, and others of the like (Latham, 1952).  Mohr (1973) 
discussed how the structure of “official groups,” such as organizations, affects the goals 
that those organizations pursue.  Mohr described two possible methods by which 
organizations set goals:  1) goals are collectively determined by the membership through 
a structured process, or 2) goals are determined for the organization by one or two 
individuals.  Mohr suggested that, while the first situation is ideal, the second is likely 
more prevalent.  Mohr also distinguished between “reflexive,” or internal, goals and 
“transitive,” or external, goals of organizations. 
Like all other groups in society, legislatures “show a sense of identity and 
consciousness” (Latham, 1952, p. 37).  Latham specifically mentioned that the constant 
power struggle between the judiciary, executive, and legislative branches of government 
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is no different from the struggles between any other groups.  He asserts that we need to 
consider the legislative process within the context of societal group dynamics.  
Legislative debate, then, “shows policy emerging as a by-product of group actions and 
interactions” (Latham, 1952, p. 221). 
 Group theory maintains some applicable concepts when applied to the role of 
interest groups in the legislative process.  However, various researchers (Browne, 1988) 
take issue with the confines of interest group theory.  Browne (1988) claimed group 
theory is too restrictive because it does not consider the role of individuals outside of 
bona fide groups.  In addition to de facto lobbyists, consultants, and other individuals 
who impact the legislative process, there are many loosely structured groups that are 
involved besides just formally organized associations.  “A great deal of tolerance must 
be allowed for the diverse structural characteristics assumed by those private interests 
that emerge as active lobbies” (Browne, 1988, p. 243).  Browne (1988) asserted that 
group theory does not recognize all relevant private interests that are active in the policy 
process.  
 What is true of group dynamics is that they are always changing.  Interest groups 
involved in the legislative decision-making process are no exception.  Truman (1951) 
stated, “perhaps the most significant feature of group politics is that it is a dynamic 
process, a constantly changing pattern of relationships involving through the years 
continual shifts in relative influence” (p. 65).  Interest groups evolve over time, both in 
their internal and external relationships.  This continuously affects interest groups’ 
policies, goals, and success in achieving their legislative objectives. 
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Exchange Theory 
 
 Exchange theory describes the internal group dynamics of interest groups 
(Baumgartner & Leech, 2004; Browne, 1988; Salisbury, 1969; Thomas, 2004; Truman, 
1951).  While group theory provides the rationale for why and how people form groups, 
exchange theory specifically explains the relationships between interest groups and their 
members.  Interest groups provide lobbying and other member services in exchange for 
dues paid by members.  Salisbury (1969) explained, “group organizers invest in a set of 
benefits which they offer to potential members at a price – joining the group” (p. 1).   
 Salisbury (1969) distinguished between the leadership of interest groups, or 
“organizers” or entrepreneurs,” as he called them, and the dues-paying members.  
Salisbury stated, “in order to sustain a group organization, it is necessary to maintain an 
adequate flow of benefits both to members and to the organizers themselves.  In short, 
there must be a mutually satisfactory exchange” (p. 25).  Salisbury (1969) claimed that 
exchange theory assumes group members have “public policy-related interests” that they 
believe can be met through the organization’s objectives and efforts. 
 Most agricultural organizations employ a grassroots, membership-driven policy 
process whereby group members determine policy objectives for the organization.  
Browne (1988) said, “few organizations move far from their members or patrons in 
deciding their policy options, both responding to and cultivating their views on pending 
issues” (p. 246).  However, Salisbury (1969) contended that group leaders will often 
pursue their own objectives for the organization, regardless of priorities established by 
the membership.  In fact, Salisbury (1969) stated, “a significant portion of what we 
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observe to be lobbying activity by group leaders may result not from a mandate derived 
from membership demands but from the personal choices and values of the group 
leaders” (p. 28).  This supports Salisbury’s claim that group leaders spend a lot of time 
“farming the membership.”  “Farming the membership” refers to attempts by group 
leaders to rally support from the membership for their own policy objectives. 
Benefits provided to members typically range from insurance discounts and other 
goods and services to the potential public policy decisions that result from lobbying 
efforts.  “An encompassing literature has shown that these services as well as an 
organization’s involvement in policy decisions are responsible for keeping successful 
interest groups together” (Browne, 1988, p. 243).  There is, however, much debate over 
how much the lobbying efforts of interest groups are responsible for growing or 
maintaining group membership.  Many researchers (Baumgartner & Leech, 2004; 
Browne, 1988; Salisbury, 1969) question how much concern interest group members 
have for the political activity of the groups they belong to.  In fact, Browne (1988) 
claimed, “establishing or maintaining an organization on the basis of lobbying potential 
alone is clearly a risky business” (p. 19).  Browne’s 1988 research concluded that 
“political action is by no means the central feature of [agricultural interest groups’] 
organizational lives” (p. 18).  Therefore, most interest groups must offer other economic 
or tangible benefits of group membership. 
  Conflict within interest groups is one of the key dynamics of exchange theory.  
No group or organization is immune to the conflicting views that are inherent between 
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leaders and members, or between different factions of the group.  Truman (1951) 
provided this example: 
Potential conflicts within the Farm Bureau between farmers who must buy 
supplementary feed and those who produce excess feed grains for the market, 
between soybean growers and dairymen, even between traditional Republicans 
and loyal Democrats, create serious political problems for the interest group. (p. 
510) 
 
Unfortunately, it is often this internal conflict that prevents interest groups from 
accomplishing any real objectives, both politically and otherwise.  “If anything, the 
diversity of internal subinterests within these groups restricts rather than facilitates active 
position taking on important issues” (Browne, 1988, p. 248).  These internal dynamics, 
or exchanges, within interest groups greatly impact the lobbying ability of the 
organization.  Truman (1951) stated, “a group’s relation to governmental institutions is 
partly determined by its own internal relationships” (p. 108).  Researchers (Baumgartner 
& Leech, 2004; Browne, 1988; Truman, 1951) argue that exchange theory, or internal 
group dynamics, is the root of successful or unsuccessful lobbying. 
 
 
Transactional Theory 
 
Transactional theory is similar to exchange theory.  Exchange theory explains the 
symbiotic relationship between interest groups and their members; transactional theory 
describes a similar relationship between lobbyists and policymakers (Bauer et al., 1972; 
Browne, 1988, 1998; Hamm, 1983; Hayes, 1981).  Lobbyists provide information and 
electoral and financial support to policymakers, in exchange for favorable legislation.  
Bauer et al. (1972) explained,  
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the appropriate general model [of this relationship] is not one of linear causality, 
but a transactional one, which views all the actors in the situation as exerting 
continuous influence on each other.  All the actors are to some extent in a 
situation of mutual influence and interdependence; A’s influence on B is to some 
extent a result of B’s prior influence on A. (pp. 456-457) 
 
Central to this transactional relationship between lobbyists and policymakers is a 
power struggle for who needs the other’s services more.  Transactional theory states that 
both parties need the benefits provided to them by the other.  Therefore, Bauer et al. 
(1972) claimed that transactional theory refutes the idea that policymakers are controlled 
by the pressure groups that lobby them.  In fact, the researchers proposed that legislators 
have a great deal of independence in choosing which constituents or interest groups to 
listen to or bargain with.  This contradicts the pressure-group model of politics, which 
purports that special interests control issues and force policymakers to pass or fail 
legislation at their command.  Hayes (1981) suggested an appropriate transactional 
theory is “one that recognizes the interdependence of legislators and lobbyists without 
underestimating the significance of groups in the policy process” (p. 4). 
Policymakers need various services and information from interest groups.  
Browne (1988) said interest groups can provide some of the “valuable information about 
farm, food, and foreign policy conditions, problems, trends, and issues that would 
otherwise not be immediately forthcoming in a useful form from either bureaucrats or 
academic specialists” (p. 53).  This information is important to policymakers both for 
identifying issues and for acting on legislation.  Policymakers must “be prisoners of their 
information; they can only represent what they know about” (Hayes, 1981, p. 58).  
Policymakers need to be informed and active on issues important to their constituents. 
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 In exchange for the information and support provided them, policymakers must 
respond to the requests of interest groups.  Bauer et al. (1972) claimed, power held by a 
policymaker is based on the “favors he can perform.  If [this power] is removed from his 
hands…the legislator is deprived of ways to win the support of constituents” (p. 456).  
Interest groups are typically seeking legislation favorable to the industries they 
represent.  For example, interest groups “approach government in quest of benefits in 
such forms as tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and licensing authority….[They may also] 
actively seek regulation in an effort to shore up cartels, restrict market entry, and avoid 
antitrust prosecution” (Hayes, 1981, p. 18).  However, interest groups are often only as 
successful insomuch as they can relate their requests to those of the legislator’s 
constituents.  Legislators often feel more directly accountable to the constituents in their 
districts than to specific interest groups.  Browne (1995) pointed out, “interest group 
information is, then, a service both less useful and more suspect in an individualistic 
Congress.  Consequently, members of Congress more routinely talk to those from [their 
districts]” (p. 150). 
Legislators need to serve their constituents just as interest groups need to serve 
their members.  Hayes (1981) commented, 
the theory is…transactional.  Legislators and lobbyists are viewed as 
interdependent insofar as they both survive by appearing to deliver benefits to 
their respective constituencies, an imperative that creates the conditions for a 
mutually beneficial exchange.  Congressmen thus retain a great deal of freedom 
even as interest group leaders obtain – or what is more important, appear to 
obtain – benefits for their memberships.  Typically, then, the relationship is less 
one of pressure than of symbiosis, as legislators and lobbyists find they have far 
more interests in common than in conflict. (p. 5) 
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Interest groups and legislators are constantly influencing each other.  One party’s 
communication with the other is undoubtedly influenced by a previous interaction.  
Bauer et al. (1972) asserted that neither party is “pressured,” but rather there is a 
continuous exchange of information and bargaining between interest groups and 
legislators. 
 Hayes (1981) discussed the transactional process between legislators and interest 
groups as “political markets subject to their own laws of supply and demand” (p. 18).  
The requests and answered requests exchanged between the two parties do simulate the 
supply and demand of such a “political market” theory.  “Legislatures as political 
markets must satisfy all the same underlying assumptions for efficient operation as apply 
to economic markets, such as perfect information and perfect competition on both the 
demand and supply sides” (Hayes, 1981, p. 5).  Hayes agreed with Bauer et al. (1972) 
that this is a true transactional relationship, with neither legislators nor interest groups 
being controlled by the other. 
 Information is the key commodity exchanged between interest groups and 
legislators.  As Browne (1988) stated, “there are few surprises about the transactions 
between agricultural lobbyists and policymakers.  As was the case when Lester Milbrath 
first studied the Washington lobby, transactional relationships are based primarily on the 
exchange of information” (p. 53).  In discussing the importance of this information to the 
legislative process, Hayes (1981) commented, “ultimately we are left with little hope but 
to improve the knowledge base of decisions” (p. 5).  Ideally, the transactions between 
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legislators and interest groups facilitate a comprehensive information base from which to 
make legislative decisions. 
 
 
Lobbying as a Communication Process 
 
Milbrath (1963) most extensively discussed lobbying as a communication 
process.  The flow of information and communication in the legislative decision-making 
process is also demonstrated by Congressman Emanuel Celler’s definition of lobbying: 
“the total of all communicated influences upon legislators with respect to legislation” 
(Milbrath, 1963, p. 185).   
Thomas (2004) observed, “the process of lobbying involves three stages that may 
overlap in practice: first, gaining access to policy makers; second, creating an attitude 
among policy makers conducive to the group’s goals; and third, influencing policy 
makers in the group’s favor” (p. 6).  Each of these stages is part of the larger 
communication process.  
Rogers (2003) defined communication as “the process by which participants 
create and share information with one another in order to reach a mutual understanding” 
(p. 18).  As a communication process, lobbying combines factual information with 
constituent opinion in an attempt to influence legislation.  Rogers (2003) distinguished, 
“mass communication channels are primarily knowledge creators, whereas interpersonal 
networks are more important in persuading individuals to adopt or reject” (p. 305).  The 
communication process is essentially the dynamic interaction of two variables:  1) 
information and 2) relationships between people.   
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Information 
The lobbying communication process acts as a medium for information 
exchange.  Rogers (2003) stated, “a communication network consists of interconnected 
individuals who are linked by patterned flows of information” (p. 337).  Milbrath (1963) 
claimed “a lobbyist is not so much a doer as he is a receiver of information” (p. 260).  
Information has value in the policy-making process. 
Information is valued as a commodity that interest groups can provide to 
legislators.  All legislators are constantly in need of current and relevant information on 
any number of topics.  Truman (1951) claimed, “access is likely to be available to 
groups somewhat in proportion to their ability to meet this need” (pp. 333-334).  This is 
because legislators use the information to make very important decisions.   
Researchers (Capell & Thomas, 2004; Truman, 1951) discussed the two primary types 
of information that legislators need:  “technical knowledge that defines the content of a 
policy issue; and political knowledge of the relative strength of competing claims and of 
the consequences of alternative decisions on a policy issue” (Truman, 1951, p. 334).  
Technical knowledge includes information about commodities, markets, management 
practices, trends, and other industry-specific facts.  Schlink (1996) found that 
“legislators perceived research to be the most effective technique or specialty in terms of 
effectiveness in achieving results on animal agricultural issues” (p. 87).  This technical 
knowledge is the type of information that interest groups and trade associations can best 
provide to legislators.  Industry groups’ command of this knowledge often provides them 
access to legislators who are seeking such information.  Capell and Thomas (2004) noted 
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that employee lobbyists typically have extensive technical knowledge about their 
industry, while contract lobbyists are more versed in the political process. 
Legislators receive information from both lobbyists and constituents in a variety 
of ways.  Methods of communication include personal visits, mail, telephone, fax, e-
mail, and many others.  Bauer et al. (1972) noted, “visitors and telephone-callers have an 
impact similar in character to that of mail.  They are listened to as indicators of feeling 
back home” (p. 436).  Bauer et al. also recognized personal contacts, fellow legislators, 
and legislative staff as important sources of information for legislators. 
 
Relationships between People / Contacts 
 Information is useless unless it is exchanged between people.  Rogers (2003) 
defined a communication channel as “the means by which messages get from one 
individual to another” (p. 18), and as “the means by which a message gets from the 
source to the receiver” (p. 204).  Lobbying as a communication process depends on these 
channels and the personal relationships associated with them.  “Decision-makers also 
want such [trusting] relationships because they need the reliable information, services, 
and pleasant trusting associations they can find with lobbyists” (Milbrath, 1963, p. 287).  
Research (Browne, 1988; Hansen, 1991; Milbrath, 1963; Schlink, 1996; Sulak, 2000) 
has shown the importance of reliable contacts between lobbyists and legislators.  “You 
get much better information from people who know you, know what your interests are, 
and know that they can trust you” (Milbrath, 1963, p. 260).  The decisions that 
legislators make are certainly influenced by the relationships and contacts they have.  
Truman (1951) explained,  
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the politician-legislator is not equivalent to the steel ball in a pinball game, 
bumping passively from post to post down an inclined plane.  He is a human 
being involved in a variety of relationships with other human beings.  In his role 
as legislator his accessibility to various groups is affected by the whole series of 
relationships that define him as a person. (p. 333) 
 
 
Relationships Determine Access 
 Relationships determine the degree of access that interest groups have to the 
governmental structure and the governmental decision-making process (Browne, 1988; 
Hansen, 1991; Thomas, 2004; Truman, 1951).  Truman (1951) stated, “toward whatever 
institution of government we observe interest groups operating, the common feature of 
all their efforts is the attempt to achieve effective access to points of decision” (p. 264).  
Thomas (2004) noted that “the separation of powers system operating in the United 
States fragments power, and thus there are many more points of access” (p. 143).  
Hansen (1991) agreed that “members of Congress establish close working relationships 
with policy advocates; those advocates thereby gain access” (p. 11).  Truman (1951) 
discussed in detail the many avenues by which interest groups can gain access to, what 
he terms, “key points of policy determination” (p. 319).  Such avenues include political 
parties, elections, the legislature, legislative committees, the executive office, the 
administration, and the judiciary branch.  Hansen’s (1991) “theory of access” stated, 
lawmakers grant interest groups access, then, only when circumstances fulfill 
two conditions:  (1) when interest groups enjoy competitive advantage over their 
rivals in meeting congressional reelection needs; and (2) when legislators expect 
the issues and circumstances that established the competitive advantage to recur. 
(p. 5) 
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Characteristics of interest groups determine how successful they will be in 
gaining access.  Such characteristics include group status in the social structure, knowing 
“the right people,” the skills and qualifications of the group’s leaders, and the effective 
organization of the group (Truman, 1951).  Also, “the relation between group 
organization and access is not, it should be noted, a matter just of being organized but 
equally of being organized appropriately for the problem at hand” (Truman, 1951, p. 
269).  Effective and efficient organization and communication is key to organizations 
seeking access. 
 Truman (1951) asserted that the most important level of government structure for 
interest groups to gain access to is the legislative process.  This is because, “especially in 
the United States, the legislature, far more than the judiciary or the executive, has been 
the primary means of effecting changes in the law of the land” (Truman, 1951, p. 321).  
In fact, the legislature and the legislative committees are where interest groups 
traditionally focus the majority of their efforts.  This is also why “ [interest] group 
activities in legislatures is reflected in a popular synonym for the political interest group, 
the word lobby” (Truman, 1951, p. 321).   
Researchers (Hamm, 1983; Milbrath, 1963; Thomas, 2004; Truman, 1951; 
Zeigler & Peak, 1972) discussed the importance of legislative access for interest groups, 
and recognized that some groups are more successful in this effort than others.  Truman 
(1951) stated, “in some forms [access] provides little more than a chance to be heard; in 
others it practically assures favorable action” (p. 321).  Gaining access is clearly only the 
first step in being able to actually influence legislation. 
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The structure, procedures, and leadership of legislative committees have a major 
impact on the ability of interest groups to gain access.  Truman (1951) reminded us that 
the primary debates and decisions on issues occur in committee hearings, not in the main 
legislative sessions:   
The effect that this system of committees has upon access stems not only from 
the relative finality of their actions but also from the comparative independence 
that they enjoy.  These bodies are subject to little or no co-ordinating influence 
from any source.  A committee majority, or even its chairman alone, effectively 
constitutes a little legislature, especially in so far as it blocks action on a 
proposal.  Therefore access to a committee majority or even to a chairman may 
give a group effective advantage in the legislature itself, to the virtual exclusion 
of its competitors. (p. 331) 
 
Browne (1988) agreed that, “research stresses the importance of congressional 
committees and subcommittees and the accompanying decline in the influence of central 
legislative leaders” (p. 46).  Interest groups seeking access in a committee are at the 
mercy of the committee leadership.  Committees have the ability to control an issue by 
the amount of time they allow for debate and through other tactics.  The access of 
interest groups is therefore limited largely by the committee process. 
 
 
Lobbying Strategies and Techniques of Interest Groups 
 
 The interest group theories discussed previously all influence the strategies and 
techniques that lobbyists use.  Browne (1985) stated, 
the strategic approach that lobbyists take to influence policymakers is a product 
of both state level political activity that also defines what interests become 
represented and those particularized needs endemic to lobbying that demand 
interaction between knowledgeable and committed group representatives and 
targeted state officials. (p. 460) 
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Lobbying as a communication process specifically discussed how lobbyists can gain 
access to the policy-making process.  Many researchers (Browne, 1988, 1998; Truman, 
1951) point out that legislative access is only the first step toward influencing 
legislation.  The techniques and strategies of interest groups greatly impact the success 
of getting favored legislation passed.  Truman (1951) said, “access must be made 
effective, and an important determinant of the interest group’s success is, therefore, the 
skill with which it and its ‘members’ in the legislature are able to exploit their position.  
This is a matter of techniques” (p. 352).  Browne (1988) stated, “lobbying must be 
discussed…as an encompassing political strategy that involves many tactics” (p. 242). 
 The techniques lobbyists employ are generally based on the information and 
relationships available to them.  Browne (1988) explained, 
policy decisions are influenced as organized private interests either directly 
manipulate or assist policymakers in handling three sets of variables:  the formal 
and informal rules by which policy is made, positive knowledge or the analysis 
of policy problems and their solutions, and value knowledge about the emotional 
and traditional appeal of certain policy proposals and goals. (p. 241) 
 
These “variables” are managed in different ways by lobbyists.  Most researchers 
(Browne, 1985, 1988; Milbrath, 1963; Schlink, 1996; Truman, 1951) discussed the 
relationships lobbyists have with legislators as one of their most important tactics.  
Beyond these relationships, there are many other strategies that lobbyists employ.  As 
Browne (1988) stated,  
on the one hand, agriculture represents an issue area in which an old style of 
close and established relationships dominates policymaking….lobbying within 
[the agricultural issue area] probably confronts the broadest array of political 
problems possible, and its practitioners probably employ the widest gamut of 
strategies and tactics found anywhere. (p. 6) 
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An extensive, but not exhaustive, list of lobbying strategies employed by interest groups 
includes: constituent pressures, grassroots mobilization, protests and demonstrations, 
political action committees and funds, consultants, communication with legislative 
committees, communication with legislative staff, communication with regulatory 
agencies, communication with the executive branch, research and supplemental 
evidence, litigation, media, public awareness campaigns, issue selection/policy agenda, 
coalitions, and compromising with opposing groups (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; 
Browne 1985, 1988, 1998; Hamm & Hogan, 2004; Schlink, 1996; Sulak, 2000; Thomas, 
2004; Truman, 1951). 
 Interest group lobbyists often call upon the group’s membership to mobilize and 
contact legislators regarding a given issue.  Interest groups recognize this grassroots 
approach as a tactic that resonates with legislators.  Browne (1988) and Schlink (1996) 
discovered legislators pay particular attention to communications from their constituents.  
“Most farm groups rely heavily on constituents to plead the organization’s case.  Those 
who come from back home on a group’s behalf bring with them a sense of what district 
voters want, or so legislators believe” (Browne, 1988, p. 89).  Schlink (1996) found that    
“lobbyists believed having an influential constituent or friend contact legislators to be 
[the] most effective [strategy]” (p. 87).  Political Action Committees (PACs), campaign 
contributions, and electoral support are other methods by which interest groups can gain 
policymaker support.  Legislators are unlikely to neglect these groups that contribute to 
their campaigns and policy agendas. 
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 Consultants are being used increasingly more by interest groups.  With the 
growing complexity of issues surrounding agriculture, even the best-staffed interest 
group cannot know the details of every issue.  Therefore, specialized consultants are 
often contracted to assist with lobbying, analyzing, or public relations efforts.  Browne 
(1988) said, “consultants and [non-profit educational or research] foundations have come 
to play an especially important and permanent role in shaping the focus of agricultural 
policy debates” (p. 166).   
 Besides direct communication with legislators, lobbyists know that 
communication with legislative staff, legislative committees, and regulatory agencies are 
also important tactics (Browne, 1988; Hamm, 1983; Milbrath, 1963; Schlink, 1996; 
Thomas, 2004; Zeigler & Baer, 1969).  Schlink (1996) stated “lobbyists established 
contacts with staffs of committees and staffs of members of state legislators very often 
and saw them of equal importance” (p. 86).  A lobbyist will often first interact with 
legislative staff when attempting to influence a legislator.  Almost all information 
intended for a legislator will first be funneled through one of their staff members 
(Browne, 1988; Schlink, 1996).  The results of Schlink’s (1996) research suggested 
“lobbyists should work with a specific legislative aide in order to influence a specific 
legislator” (p. 97). 
Communicating with legislative committees is another important aspect of 
influencing policy.  Agricultural interest groups have historically interacted the most 
with agricultural committees and subcommittees.  These agricultural committees still 
handle a majority of the issues surrounding agriculture; however, Browne (1988) also 
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pointed to the importance of appropriations committees.  “Appropriations committees, 
with their agricultural subcommittees, are of vital concern when programs must be 
funded, since some financial limitations will affect the degree to which services and 
benefits can be provided” (Browne, 1988, p. 45).  The growing diversity of agricultural 
issues, combined with budgetary concerns, has required agricultural interest groups to 
lobby a wider breadth of legislative committees and regulatory agencies.  While the 
USDA is still the primary agency responsible for agricultural programs, regulatory 
growth and expansion of agricultural issues have increased the number of governmental 
agencies that agricultural groups interact with.  Browne (1988) gave examples such as 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Department of Commerce, the 
Department of Transportation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of the 
Interior, and the U.S. Trade Representative’s office.  Browne (1988) stated that, while 
lobbying the leadership was not as important as lobbying the legislature or regulatory 
agencies, it was still important “in the total dynamics of policymaking” (p. 51). 
 Research is increasingly relied on in the lobbying process.  Legislators respond to 
arguments that are based on scientific studies.  Therefore, “lobbyists search diligently for 
supplemental evidence in support of group positions both inside and outside agriculture” 
(Browne, 1988, p. 44).  Science-based research is weighted heavily in the policy 
decision-making process.  This research is equally as important if and when lobbyists 
pursue policy objectives through litigation.  Browne (1988) observed that “according to 
[interview] respondents, litigation as a proactive lobbying tactic gains more proponents 
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each year” (p. 44).  While lobbying styles may change, the research-based content of 
these arguments will most likely remain central to the process. 
 Interest groups commonly use public relations and media campaigns to promote 
their policy objectives.  Browne (1988) stated, “if carefully coordinated and able to 
strike a responsive chord, public relations campaigns can bring awareness of an issue or 
policy option directly to the public and to the media-conscious policymakers by 
forcefully dramatizing it” (p. 47).  Public relations efforts generate public awareness as 
well as influence policymakers.  These public relations efforts remain key lobbying 
strategies. 
 Before an interest group can roll out a media campaign or begin lobbying, they 
must internally select their issues, or set their policy agenda.  Issue selection is a 
fundamental lobbying tactic in and of itself (Browne, 1998).  Lobbyists strategically 
choose issues they believe are important, are necessary, or are easy to win.  Browne 
(1988) observed, “organizations are most likely to structure their agendas on the basis of 
winnable policy demands, and an ability to win seems to be greatly determined by an 
interest’s expertise, recognition of the issue at hand, and acceptance by policymakers” 
(p. 201).  The policy agendas of interest groups are the first of many lobbying strategies 
employed throughout a legislative session. 
 The lobbying strategies for promoting an issue are different from the lobbying 
strategies used to defeat an issue.  “When the lobbying goal entails defeating a proposal 
or reforming a current program, strategies for working with members often change.  
Soliciting one or more spokespersons remains the preferred method” (Browne, 1988, p. 
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46).  In general, lobbyists indicated that defeating a piece of legislation was not as time-
intensive as promoting a piece of legislation.  When interest groups proactively sponsor 
legislation, they must spend more individual time with the legislator who carries their 
bill.  They also must spend time informing other legislators about the issue and 
generating support. 
 One way lobbyists can more efficiently garner support for their issues is by 
working with other interest groups.  Coalitions are an extremely important strategy used 
by interest groups (Browne, 1988, 1998; Sulak, 2000; Truman, 1951).  Truman (1951) 
said, “rarely can any single group achieve its legislative objectives without assistance 
from other groups” (p. 362).  Coalitions are often formed around specific issues, but they 
can be temporary or permanent, formal or informal, large or small.  “Lobbyists share 
information and contacts, work toward mutually agreeable positions, and jointly plan 
strategy” (Browne, 1988, p. 51).  While interest groups recognize the importance of 
coalitions for accomplishing policy goals, there are many challenges associated with 
forming coalitions.  The individual goals, structures, and personalities of interest groups 
cause conflict in coalition relationships.  Nonetheless, individual groups form these 
coalitions  “in pursuit of a policy which bears some substantive relation to the interests 
of each” (Truman, 1951, p. 363).  Therefore, compromise is central to the success of 
coalition efforts.  Interest groups must compromise amongst themselves when forming a 
coalition, before attempting to influence policy.  Browne (1988) noted that, “to 
overcome uncertainty, lobbyists negotiate with other private interests at least as much as 
they do with policymakers” (p. 51).  A classic example of agricultural interest groups 
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compromising and forming coalitions with environmental groups is explained by Orden 
et al. (1999): 
In Congress, although members from farm districts were fewer in number than 
ever before, they found a new logrolling partner to help defend farm programs: 
the environmental lobby, which had emerged from the 1970s with considerable 
political clout.  It was something of a challenge for the farm lobby to overcome 
the mistrust between farmers (protective of their private property rights) and 
environmental activists (ready to impose sharp governmental regulations).  Yet, 
the advantages seen by some farm groups from idling land to boost prices 
dovetailed neatly with the interests of environmentalists in idling land to reduce 
soil erosion, groundwater contamination, and loss of wildlife habitats. (p. 77)  
 
Not all of the individual policy goals of every interest group can be realized through the 
policy process.  Compromise must happen at every level.  Truman (1951) stated, “even a 
temporarily viable legislative decision usually must involve the adjustment and 
compromise of interests” (p. 392). 
 Despite the extensive use of coalitions amongst agricultural interest groups, 
many researchers argue that these coalitions are not effectively used to address broader 
agricultural policy reform.  Browne (1988) observed, “coalitions of multiple interests 
have not been important vehicles for resolving macrolevel – or even mid-range – policy 
differences that divide agriculture” (p. 168) and “there is little sense of a collective 
system of representation in American agriculture” (p. 167).  Agricultural interest groups 
vary widely in the types of commodities and issues they represent, and, therefore, in the 
policy priorities they pursue. 
 Many factors influence the strategies and techniques that lobbyists use.  One of 
the most notable is the characteristics specific to the state or national government they 
are lobbying.  Browne (1985) stated, “lobbying, it seems, must reflect how state 
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government operates rather than a set of techniques always appropriate to a specific 
occupation” (p. 466).  Browne (1988) also observed that “group strategies and tactics – 
or the style of lobbying – may vary considerably under different political circumstances” 
(p. 53).   
Truman (1951) discussed how the differences in national and state governmental 
structures affect the methods and success of interest groups.  He specifically mentioned 
the importance of interest groups gaining access to committees.  This access is often 
more difficult to achieve at the state level because “state legislative sessions are shorter 
and less frequent and since many State legislators perform their duties on a part-time 
basis, there is usually less opportunity for prolonged committee consideration in the 
States” (Truman, 1951, p. 331).  The role of committees in the state legislatures varies 
widely.  In some, their place is roughly similar to that of the congressional committee, 
whereas in others it is sharply different.  Truman (1951) discussed how equal 
representation of states in the U.S. Senate “has allowed agricultural interest groups that 
are predominant in many thinly populated States more points of access in the Senate 
than urban groups whose members are concentrated in a few populous States” (p. 322).   
How districts are drawn, both for state and national governments, affect the 
make-up of the legislature, and therefore how lobbyists must approach it.  Browne 
(1985) observed, “different styles of lobbying and interaction emerge which are 
supported by state-specific definitions, or norms, about appropriate relationships 
between lobbyists and policymakers” (p. 466).  Government dynamics specific to 
different legislatures affects the ease of access and the lobbying strategies used by 
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lobbyists.  Schlink (1996) recognized the need for more studies investigating the 
dynamics of legislative decision-making processes at the state level. 
Not all researchers credit the strategies and techniques of lobbyists for their 
success or failure in achieving policy objectives.  Orden et al. (1999) discussed how 
political, economic, and social environments over time have sustained the success of 
farm lobby groups.  Orden et al. claimed that the success of agricultural interest groups 
has been due to these environments, rather than any specific lobbying techniques.  The 
researchers primarily discussed the role of farm lobby groups in protecting farm 
programs.  Orden et al. claimed that a shrinking farm population has not decreased the 
clout of farm lobby groups, primarily because these groups are well organized and self-
serving.  The researchers’ primary argument for farm policy reform was that most of the 
current U.S. farm programs are no longer necessary.  They claimed that current farm 
policy is not determined by interest group competition or by compromises that result 
from political discussions.  The researchers asserted that the occurrence of historical 
events, and the policy that resulted, has facilitated the success of farm lobby groups.  
Orden et al.’s thesis was that the environment and dynamics of the political process has 
not allowed current farm policy reform to transpire as it should. 
Browne (1988) agreed that, 
when policymakers of the 1930s decided to make farm economic policy by 
assigning benefits to distinct commodity producers, they unwittingly set into 
motion a rewards process that policymakers later would adjust to for better 
monitoring.  Private interests would also react and adjust to the process to get 
what they could from government. (p. 240) 
 
However, Browne (1988) continued by stating,  
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there is no evidence, however, that these organized interests have ever had the 
influence, individually or collectively, to set the policy agenda within agriculture 
or adjust it.  The blame seems to fall on the policy process, of which interest 
groups are just a part.  Any such blame…should be assigned to a factor long 
addressed by the traditions of political science, the structure by which policy 
decisions are made. (p. 240) 
 
Regardless of which entities may have influence, there are political, social, and 
economic dynamics that impact the success of interest groups in influencing the policy-
making process.  Thomas (2004) stated,  
interest groups do not develop or operate in a vacuum.  The development of an 
interest group system, the types of groups and interests that exist, and the way 
they attempt to influence public policy are determined by historical, 
geographical, cultural, social, economic, political, governmental structural and 
other factors. (p. 67) 
 
Interest groups are an integral part of the political environment; they both influence and 
are influenced by other entities within the process. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework and Sources of Information Utilized by Interest Groups 
 As mentioned in the introduction, the involvement of interest groups in the 
policy-making process is described by Browne (personal communication, October 30, 
2003) as a communication process: 
 
Sources of  Æ Interest Groups Æ  Information        Æ      Legislators Æ Favored 
Information        (+Constituent Beliefs, etc.)      Legislation 
 
 
Most of this study’s theoretical framework is associated with the latter stages of this 
communication process.  However, elitism versus pluralism, the iron triangle concept, 
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group theory, exchange theory, transactional theory, and lobbying as a communication 
process are all theories that relate to information sources used by lobbyists.   
Most of the research (Browne, 1988, 1990, 1998; Milbrath, 1963; Salisbury et 
al., 1987; Thomas, 2004) related to lobbying as a communication process has studied the 
dynamics of communication between lobbyists and legislators.  However, these findings 
can be extrapolated to the interactions that occur between lobbyists and the information 
sources they use.  The lobbying communication process between lobbyists and 
legislators was described as the interaction of information and personal relationships, or 
contacts.  This dynamic is also true of the interaction between lobbyists and their sources 
of information.  While some sources are easily accessible, many involve personal 
relationships, or knowing whom to contact for information.  Browne (1988) observed, 
“the lobbyist simply asks, usually on a case-by-case basis, ‘whom shall I contact and 
why?’” (p. 43).  This observation was made in reference to a lobbyist’s effort to 
influence the legislature; however, lobbyists likely ask the same question in their attempt 
to contact sources and gain information.  
Relationships and personal contacts were discussed as the primary determinant of 
an interest group’s access to the legislative process.  An interest group’s access to 
information sources is based on many of the same factors as its access to the legislative 
process.  It could be argued that an interest group’s access to information sources is 
equally as important as its access to the legislative process.  An interest group needs 
adequate and correct information to have any success in lobbying the legislature.  Access 
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is clearly important at all stages of the policy-making process, including the initial 
gathering of information by interest groups. 
 The strategies and techniques of lobbyists reveal more about how information is 
gained, analyzed, and transferred as part of the policy-making process.  Just as the 
techniques lobbyists use are based on the information and contacts available to them, the 
sources of information they use are based on these same two factors.  The majority of 
lobbying strategies and techniques discussed are also avenues by which lobbyists can 
gain information initially or throughout the process.  Constituents, members, consultants, 
legislative committees, legislative staff, regulatory officials, research, litigation, media 
and public relations efforts, internal issues selection processes, and coalitions can all be 
sources of information for lobbyists. 
 I sought to identify the sources of information utilized by California agricultural 
interest groups, as well as the rationale and process of this selection.  The findings will 
contribute to the broader theoretical framework and existing theories regarding interest 
groups. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Research Design 
 
 A qualitative, exploratory approach was used in this study.  The research design 
was aligned with Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) “grounded theory.”  Grounded theory is 
defined as “the discovery of theory from data systematically obtained from social 
research” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 2).  This study design supported the use of the 
constant comparative method of data analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Patton, 2002).  
Grounded theory is an inductive research method whereby the researcher collects and 
analyzes data in an effort to develop theory. 
 The research design was intended to facilitate the collection of data regarding 
California agricultural interest groups and the sources of information they utilize.  From 
these data, theory was developed regarding the process by which California agricultural 
interest groups select sources of information.  This theoretical development will, ideally, 
be integrated into existing theory regarding the communication process used by interest 
groups. 
 Qualitative research has some inherent weaknesses in terms of objectivity and 
quality of participants’ responses.  The participants had control over the responses, and I 
had to be careful to remain objective when reporting these results.  This exploratory 
research was also challenging due to the open-ended nature of the questions; responses 
varied greatly between participants.  I was vigilant to not identify an interest group by its 
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participant’s responses.  In addition, participant responses could represent the 
participant’s own opinions, and not necessarily the overall identity of the interest group 
he or she represented.  Finally, Patton (2002) stated, “the challenge of qualitative data 
lies in making sense of massive amounts of data” (p. 432).   
 Conversely, “one of the strengths of qualitative analysis is looking at program 
units holistically” (Patton, 2002, p. 228).  “A qualitative research design needs to remain 
sufficiently open and flexible to permit exploration of whatever the phenomenon under 
study offers for inquiry.  Qualitative designs continue to be emergent even after data 
collection begins” (Patton, 2002, p. 255).  Thus, a primary strength of this research 
design was the immense amount of detailed, thorough data that it provided.  This 
exploratory, interview-based research should provide meaningful data to the study of 
interest group theory.   
 
Population and Sample 
 A purposive sample was selected for this research.  Patton (2002) stated, 
 
what would be ‘bias’ in statistical sampling, and therefore a weakness, becomes 
intended focus in qualitative sampling, and therefore a strength.  The logic and 
power of purposeful sampling lie in selecting information-rich cases for study in 
depth.  Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal 
about issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry, thus the term 
purposeful sampling (p. 230).   
 
Purposeful sampling is also known as purposive or judgment sampling. 
 The purposive sample was comprised of agricultural interest groups representing 
the top ten agricultural commodities in California.  These top ten agricultural 
commodities were determined in terms of economic profitability based on data from the 
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California Agricultural Statistics Service.  The top ten commodities provided a diverse 
sample of California’s total agricultural production: milk and cream, grapes (all), 
nursery, lettuce (all), cattle and calves, almonds, strawberries, flowers, tomatoes (all), 
and hay (all).   
I purposefully selected the groups with the advice of Jack King, Manager of the 
National Affairs and Research Division at the California Farm Bureau Federation.  Mr. 
King served as a gatekeeper in helping me identify an appropriate sample.  Mr. King 
works closely with these groups and was therefore able to provide me with advice on 
developing a representative sample of the top ten commodities in California.  I chose not 
to include any state commodity boards or commissions because these groups are quasi-
governmental, and are therefore under certain restrictions regarding their lobbying 
abilities.  The groups initially chosen, and the commodities they represent, included:  
Western United Dairymen (milk and cream), California Association of Winegrape 
Growers (grapes), Wine Institute (grapes), California Association of Nurseries and 
Garden Centers (nursery), Western Growers Association (lettuce, strawberries, tomatoes, 
hay, etc.), California Cattlemen’s Association (cattle and calves), Blue Diamond 
Growers (almonds), California Association of Flower Growers and Shippers (flowers), 
California Tomato Growers Association (tomatoes), California Alfalfa and Forage 
Association (hay), and the California Farm Bureau Federation (all commodities).  
However, this sample changed as I familiarized myself with the population.   
 The original intent was to interview only employee lobbyists of agricultural 
interest groups in California.  However, I discovered that, for various reasons, some of 
  
 58
these groups employ contract lobbyists.  And, many of these contract lobbyists represent 
more than one agricultural interest group.  As expected, the employee lobbyists and 
contract lobbyists know each other and often work together.  By talking to various 
lobbyists, I was able to gain an understanding of who represents what in California’s 
agricultural lobby.  In this way, I determined which lobbyists would provide a quality 
representation of the top ten agricultural commodities in California.  Table 1 summarizes 
the lobbyists interviewed by commodity.  A total of 15 interviews were conducted.  
Twelve of the 15 interviewees were registered lobbyists.  The other three were not 
registered because their roles in their respective organizations are more administrative; 
therefore, they do not work a sufficient percentage of their time on activities for which 
the law requires registration.    
 
Table 1 
 
Purposive Sample of Lobbyists Interviewed by Primary Commodities  
CA Value Commodity Interest Group/Organization Interviewee
1 Milk and Cream Western United Dairymen Gary Conover
2 Grapes, All The Gualco Group, Inc. Jack Gualco
(representing California Association of Winegrape Growers)
Wine Institute Mike Falasco
3 Nursery Kahn, Soares & Conway, LLP Louie Brown
(representing California Association of Nurseries and Garden Centers)
4 Lettuce, All Western Growers Jasper Hempel
5 Cattle and Calves California Cattlemen's Association Susan LaGrande
6 Almonds Agricultural Council of California Don Gordon
(representing Blue Diamond Growers)
7 Strawberries Western Growers Jasper Hempel
8 Flowers California Cut Flower Commision Rich Matteis
9 Tomatoes, All Agricultural Council of California Don Gordon
(representing California Tomato Growers Association, Inc.)
Western Growers Jasper Hempel
10 Hay, All California Grain and Feed Association Rich Matteis
California Seed Association
Agricultural Council of California Don Gordon
All Commodities California Farm Bureau Federation Jack King
Pam Giacomini
Cynthia Cory
Roy Gabriel
John Gamper
Anthony Francois
George Gomes
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As mentioned, some of these lobbyists represented more than one agricultural 
organization.  This allows many lobbyists to be familiar with a variety of issues affecting 
the agricultural industry, which in turn enhanced their responses to interview questions.  
Table 2 indicates the agricultural organizations represented by each lobbyist interviewed. 
 
Table 2 
Lobbyists Interviewed by the Agricultural Organizations They Represent 
Interest Group/Organization Groups they Represent (if applicable) Person Interviewed
Western United Dairymen Gary Conover
California Cattlemen's Association Susan LaGrande
Agricultural Council of California Agrilink Foods Don Gordon
Alliance of Western Milk Producers
Allied Grape Growers
Apricot Producers of California
Blue Diamond Growers
Butte County Rice Growers Association
Calavo, Inc.
Calcot, Ltd.
California Association of Winegrape Growers
California Canning Peach Association
California Cattlemen's Association
California Fig Institute
California Planting Cotton Seed Distributors
California Poultry Industry Federation
California Tomato Growers Association, Inc.
California Wool Growers Association
Cal-Pure Pistachios
Cal/West Seeds
Central California Almond Growers Association
Certified Farmers' Markets of Sacramento
CoBank
Dairyman's/Land O'Lakes
Diamond of California
Dos Palos Cooperative Gin, Inc.
Fruit Growers Supply Company
Hazelnut Growers of Oregon
Laton Cooperative Gin, Inc.
Mid-Valley Cotton Growers, Inc.
Pacific Coast Producers
Raisin Bargaining Association
San Joaquin Valley Hay Growers Association
San Luis Obispo County Farm Supply Company, Inc.
South Valley Gins, Inc.
Squab Producers of Califonia
Sunkist Growers, Inc.
Sun-Maid Growers of California
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Table 2 Continued 
 
Sunsweet Growers, Inc.
Sutter Basin Growers Cooperative
Tule River Cooperative Dryer, Inc.
Valley Fig Growers
Visalia Cooperative Cotton Gin
US AgBank, FCB
Westside Farmers Cooperative Gin, Inc.
Wine Institute Mike Falasco
The Gualco Group, Inc. California Association of Winegrape Growers Jack Gualco
Agricultural Council of California
California Association of Pest Control Advisors
SunMaid Raisins
Imperial Irrigation District
Kern County Water Agency
Modesto Irrigation District
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority
Solano County Water Agency
other non-agricultural business entities
(see names of organizations) California Grain and Feed Association Rich Matteis
California Seed Association
Pacific Coast Renderers Association
Central Valley Project Water Association
California Fisheries & Seafood Institute
California Warehouse Association
California State Floral Association
California Pear Growers
Pacific Egg and Poultry Association
California Bean Shippers Association
California Grape Rootstock Improvement Commission
California Egg Industry Association
Buy California Marketing Agreement
California Association of Wheat Growers
California Cut Flower Commission
California Aquaculture Association
Western Growers Jasper Hempel
Kahn, Soares & Conway, LLP California Citrus Mutual Louie Brown
California Cotton Growers Association
California Cotton Ginners Association
California Association of Nurseries and Garden Centers
Nisei Farmers League
California Grape and Treefruit League
Western Plant Health Association
California Agricultural Aircraft Association
Alliance of Western Milk Producers
California Apple Commission
California Asparagus Commission
California Avocado Commission
California Cut Flower Commission
California Date Commission
California Forest Products Commission
California Grape Rootstock Improvement Commission
California Kiwifruit Commission
California Pepper Commission
California Pistachio Commission
California Rice Commission
California Rice Industry Association
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Table 2 Continued 
 
 
Measurement Procedures / Instrument 
 The research inst w guide that consisted 
f seve
n 
verall, the seven interview questions addressed the five objectives of this study.  
Questio
 
California Sheep Commission
California Tomato Commission
California Walnut Commission
California Wool Growers Association
Lodi-Woodbridge Winegrape Commission
Mendocino Wine Growers Alliance
California Farm Bureau Federation All Commodities Jack King
Cynthia Cory
Pam Giacomini
Tony Francois
Roy Gabriel
John Gamper
George Gomes
 
rument (see Appendix A) was an intervie
o n open-ended series of questions.  Some questions had multiple parts, or 
addressed more than one aspect of a single concept.  A list of possible informatio
sources was compiled before the interviews, in order to provide participants with 
possibilities and to stimulate other ideas.  See Appendix B for the list of possible 
sources. 
O
ns one and seven provided the interviewer with a general understanding of the 
interest group and its role in the agricultural policy domain.  This information helped to
compare responses between interest groups, and to evaluate each participant’s responses 
within the context of this study.  Questions two, three, four, five, and six each 
specifically addressed one of the five study objectives.  
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The interview guide did not distinguish between state and national issues, in an 
effort to better understand the entirety of the lobbyists’ methods and issues.  Most of the 
interviewees were lobbyists who lobby on behalf of interest groups at the state level.  
However, many of these lobbyists also address issues and efforts of national scope.    
 The interview guide was an unpublished, untested instrument.  The design was 
reliable as other researchers have used this form of interview procedure when 
conducting exploratory studies (Browne, 1988, 1990, 1995; Dahl, 1961; Lauman & 
Knoke, 1987; Milbrath, 1963; Salisbury et al., 1987).  In addition, the instrument was 
developed through the advice and recommendations of researchers who have conducted 
similar studies.   
Some of the instrument guides used by previous researchers included specific 
answer options for the interviewees to choose from.  However, even these interview 
guides maintained some open-ended questions and allowed for additional comments 
beyond the specified answer options.  The interviews for this study were face to face.  
The open-ended nature of the interview questions did create some ambiguity and lack of 
response from the interviewees.  It was therefore the role of the interviewer to stimulate 
interest and probe for information during the interview processes. 
 
Data Collection 
Overall, data were gathered in three ways:  1) interviews, 2) document analysis, 
and 3) persistent observation.  The interviews provided the bulk of the data.  “The 
purpose of interviewing…is to allow us to enter into the other person’s perspective.  
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Qualitative interviewing begins with the assumption that the perspective of others is 
meaningful, knowable, and able to be made explicit” (Patton, 2002, p. 341). 
The interviews were standardized open-ended interviews (Patton, 2002).  Two 
primary reasons for this method were:  “1) the exact instrument used in the evaluation 
[will be] available for inspection by those who will use the findings of the study…[and] 
2) analysis [will be] facilitated by making responses easy to find and compare” (Patton, 
2002, p. 346).  All interviews were conducted using the interview guide, and were about 
one hour long.  However, if the participant required additional time to answer questions, 
that time was allowed.  The interviews were audiotaped and the proceedings were 
transcribed accordingly.  Member checking was done by mailing each typed interview 
proceeding to the respective participant to confirm that the data reflected the 
participants’ intended responses. 
Interview participants were contacted by letter, telephone, and/or e-mail to 
request their participation in the study and to schedule interview times.  Interviews were 
conducted at the agricultural interest group’s main offices or other locations that were 
convenient for each participant.   
 The triangulation trustworthiness criterion of credibility, transferability, and 
dependability was achieved through peer debriefing and member checking.  The use of 
triangulation helps ensure data validity, and strengthens a study by combining methods 
(Patton, 2002).  Confidentiality was ensured as I used the same interview guide when 
interviewing all participants.  No personal identification was placed on the results in 
  
 64
order to ensure confidentiality.  All results were coded and only group data were 
reported in the findings. 
 
Data Analysis 
Grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) is based on the researcher immersing 
himself/herself in the data, or being grounded in the data, in order to identify categories 
and relationships as they emerge.  “Grounded theory is meant to ‘build theory rather than 
test theory’” (Patton, 2002, p. 489).  Grounded theory supports the constant comparative 
method of research analysis. 
Data analysis was conducted using the four steps of the constant comparative 
method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  The constant comparative method is a method of data 
analysis that uses “explicit coding and analytical procedures” to systematically develop 
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 102).  The four stages of the constant comparative 
method include:  “1) comparing incidents applicable to each category, 2) integrating 
categories and their properties, 3) delimiting the theory, and 4) writing the theory” 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 105).  While each stage eventually leads to the following 
one, all previous stages may simultaneously remain in operation until the process is 
complete. 
Thick description was used as a trustworthiness criterion to ensure transferability.  
Patton (2002) said, “thick, rich description provides the foundation for qualitative 
analysis and reporting” (p. 437).   
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The constant comparative method is an inductive method of theory development.  
“Inductive analysis involves discovering patterns, themes, and categories in one’s data.  
Findings emerge out of the data, through the analyst’s interactions with the data” 
(Patton, 2002, p. 453). 
Initial analysis of the data included reading and determining reoccurring themes 
throughout the data.  After initial analysis was complete, I engaged in a peer debriefing 
whereby committee members and colleagues reviewed initial findings, suggested 
additional analysis, and provided advice regarding the progress of the research.   
While the interview instrument was composed of open-ended questions, I 
predicted at least some similarities in responses among participants.  These similarities 
in the data generated identifiable categories within each objective area.  The defining 
rule for the constant comparative method is “while coding an incident for a category, 
compare it with the previous incidents in the same and different groups coded in the 
same category” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 106).  Data were coded into as many 
categories as emerged.  Finally, through constantly comparing the categories and their 
properties, I began to develop a theoretical concept from the data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 66
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
 
Issues Addressed by California Agricultural Interest Groups 
Lobbyists of California agricultural interest groups were asked what the principal 
agricultural issues were that their organizations addressed.  While some interviewees 
went into greater detail than others, a frequency count of the issues mentioned is useful. 
See Table 3 for a summary of issues addressed by interviewees.  The seven most 
commonly mentioned issues included:  water resources - water supply, flood control, 
water quality regulations, etc.; air quality regulations; business issues - fees, economic 
concerns, etc.; tax issues - death tax, inheritance tax, tax preferences, etc.; land use; farm 
labor or immigration; and pesticide use and pesticide registration. 
 
Table 3 
Issues Addressed by California Agricultural Interest Groups 
 
Issue
Total 
mentioned
 W
 
 Land us
 Pes
 LaborPes
 
W
Endanger
ater resources - water supply, flood control, water quality regs 8
Air quality 6
General business issues, fees, economics 6
Tax matters - death tax, inheritance tax, tax preferences 5
e 5
Farm labor, immigration 5
ticide use, pesticide registration 5
Commodities, in general 4
 employment - working conditions, minimum wage 4
t control strategies - prevention, exclusion, eradication 4
orkers compensation 4
ed species protection 3
Funding for research 3
Employee housing 3
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Table 3 continued 
 
ne interviewee specifically noted the political environment in California since 
1998 h
or an 
agricultural interest group. 
General environmental issues 3
Health insurance for employees 2
Transportation 2
Cooperative-specific provisions 2
Trade, trade competition 1
Exports 1
Multiple use of public lands, grazing rights 1
Wilderness designation of public lands 1
Natural resources 1
Wildlife habitat 1
Property, property rights 1
Farm Bill issues 1
Specialty crops 1
Fresh produce industry 1
Farm program commodities 1
Forestry 1
Conservation measures 1
Research 1
Appropriations 1
Funding for state programs 1
Employment health and safety regs 1
Homeland Security 1
Border protection 1
Disease problems 1
New animal identification program 1
Biotechnology 1
Animal welfare 1
Animal health 1
Water rights 1
Public utilities 1
Nutrition, obesity 1
"Hard to find an issue in which we will not be involved" 1
 
O
as greatly impacted what issues their organization addresses (5).  The political 
shift created a new emphasis on environmental issues.  In fact, many interviewees 
discussed how California’s political environment impacts their work as a lobbyist f
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Lobbyists were proud of the work they did representing California agriculture.  
One interviewee stated, “agriculture is a very difficult business….weather dependent, as 
you kn
hallenging business 
 
Defending Issues Versus Asking for New Protections 
Lobbyists were asked whether they were generally defending issues or asking for 
new protection.  ion of the two; 
they sp
ed 
 and 
ing 
that reg ty 
ow, pest problems, it’s cyclical in nature, has a tendency for 
oversupply….somebody finds a new crop to grow, then before you know it, a whole 
bunch of people are doing it and the price goes to heck.  It’s a very c
and it’s my pleasure to represent farmers in trying to keep their businesses profitable”
(9). 
 
Many of the interviewees answered with some combinat
ent time both defending and being proactive on issues.  Many had difficulty 
determining whether the lobbying activities they engaged in were considered defending 
or asking for new protection.  In many cases, lobbyists discussed asking for new 
protections as a form of defending the industry.  In general, lobbyists discussed 
“defending” as maintaining current exemptions, or as fighting against new propos
regulations.  Lobbyists discussed “asking for new protection” as being proactive
looking for other legislative or regulatory solutions to problems the industry faces.  
Other interviewees noted that whether they were defending or asking for new 
protection was issue specific.  Still others said they weren’t doing either, but just ask
ulations and legislation be “balanced and based on science” (2).  The complexi
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of issues often caused lobbyists to be both defending and asking for new protection on 
different aspects of the same issue.  
Most lobbyists admitted they needed to be, and desired to be, more proactive.  
Examp
ecific 
ever, 
ces five or six pieces of legislation on a proactive 
basis.  
 
e 
l 
busyness were revealed as factors that caused lobbyists to commonly 
be in a   
 
les of proactive efforts included lobbying for:  1) funding for research or 
programs; 2) legislation that allowed growers to impose a self-tax to address a sp
problem in their industry, such as an invasive species; 3) continued exemptions for 
agriculture; and 4) exemptions to new legislation moving through the process.  How
one lobbyist emphasized “new exemptions” do not give new protection, but rather serve 
only to maintain the status quo (12). 
One lobbyist annually introdu
The lobbyist does this for two reasons:  1) “there is always an opportunity to 
improve the lot of [the people you represent] in some way,” and 2) “it helps keep you
connected” (13).  Another lobbyist noted their organization recently decided to be mor
proactive:  “we’ve been very defensive for the last few years, since 1998, and frankly, 
we don’t like it.  So, for the last two years, we’ve been very aggressive at the state leve
and at the federal level” (14).  “At the state level, our board has, over the last five years, 
become even more activist and said, ‘let’s not wait and try to kill bills; let’s be very 
proactive’” (14). 
Time and 
defensive mode.  “We don’t have a lot of time anymore to sit and read and think.
We have to act….If you’re proactive you have to sit down and you have to think, you 
have to write, you have to analyze, you have to ask people, you have to include people
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and if you’re not afforded that ability then you tend to be defensive in your 
nature….You don’t have time to be proactive” (5). 
 Despite the proactive efforts of some organizations, most lobbyists admitted that 
e ma
 
nt 
ode.  
Role of California’s Political Environment
th jority of their time is spent defending against new regulations.  A primary reason 
was because of the economic burden that increasing regulations have had on agricultural
operations.  One lobbyist stated, “we are defending ourselves in the fact that most of the 
regulations that end up adopted, if not all of them, are expensive items to operate on a 
ranch or adopt on a ranch” (5).  Two lobbyists specified that 80% of their time was spe
defending against issues that would negatively impact the agricultural industry (4,15).   
 Every year there are numerous legislative and regulatory statutes introduced that 
lobbyists of agricultural interest groups must act upon.  Many lobbyists noted that there 
has been a sharp increase in potentially burdensome proposals over the past several 
years.  This has caused lobbyists to spend the majority of their time in a defensive m
 
 
ornia’s political environment has a major 
impact
the make-up of our legislature with primarily liberal, urban legislators that, in 
most cases, have very little sympathy towards business and industry in this state, 
 
 
Many lobbyists discussed how Calif
 on the work they do (5,6,7,8,11,13,15).  Many specifically identified it as a 
primary reason why they spend so much of their time on the defense.  One lobbyist 
stated, 
has resulted in a substantial deterioration of our business climate here.  A lot of
employers, agriculture and otherwise, have either downsized, or quit farming.  
Other companies have out-sourced jobs to other states or even other countries.  
So it’s very difficult to be in business in this state and compete with the onerous
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number of rules and regulations and statutes which come down on employers on
a daily basis. (8) 
 
 
Other lobbyists agreed that increasing regulations were making it more and more 
wo 
bout the partisan committee structure:  “It’s really a 
 
 
e 
e political 
environ
d 
epublican 
difficult for agriculture, as part of the business community, to remain profitable.  T
lobbyists specifically commented that their organizations believed we have more 
government than we need (10,14). 
 Lobbyists also commented a
sad commentary to our political process….[members have] already made up their mind, 
so they just go through the [committee hearing] motions….and 90% of the votes in the 
[name of two legislative committees] are straight partisan votes” (8).  These reasons are
also why some groups don’t attempt to advance their own proactive legislation:  they 
wouldn’t get a fair hearing or the legislation’s intended purpose would be eliminated.  
 Lobbyists also noted that the agriculture industry is not being affected solely 
through the legislative process.  The regulatory and judicial processes are just as activ
arenas for statutes that could impact agriculture.  For this reason, many agricultural 
interest groups are focusing more and more of their resources in these areas.  
California agricultural interest groups have been greatly affected by th
ment in California, especially over the past ten years (5,6,7,8,11,13,15).  The 
Democratically controlled legislature has influenced the introduction of many laws an
regulations that are burdensome on California farmers and ranchers.  Various 
interviewees stated that this political shift has included:  1) a transition from R
to Democratic Administration, 2) the introduction of term limits, and 3) a much more 
active and extreme environmental lobby.  Besides impacting whether lobbyists are 
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defensive or proactive, this political shift has impacted agricultural interest groups i
other ways as well. 
 The political
n 
 shift has changed and increased the number of issues agricultural 
ot 
ne 
erm limits in California we noticed a severe educational problem of 
legislators, and their ability to have knowledge [about the specific commodity].  
 
obbyists must now work harder to keep new legislators educated as they join the 
ation 
 a situation where legislation was enacted without the 
researc
t the 
get turned into implementation” (2). 
interest groups must address.  For many organizations, it caused them to change how 
they lobby.  Namely, some have opted to employ a contract lobbyist because they cann
keep up with both the issues and the legislators that need to be lobbied.  Term limits, 
especially, have made establishing relationships even more important for lobbyists.  O
lobbyist observed, 
because of t
[This was due to] term limits and new people in the Capitol, as well as a change 
from a Republican Administration to a Democratic Administration.  The 
emphasis seemed to shift very quickly then to environmental issues. (5) 
L
legislature.  One lobbyist commented that, because of this, “your sources of inform
are deeper, they’re greater, [and] your workload is twice as much because the education 
process is so huge now” (5).  
One lobbyist explained
h or scientific evidence to support its necessity.  The legislation negatively 
impacted the agriculture industry, and thus an extensive series of negotiations abou
issue began.  The lobbyist was frustrated and said, “I don’t have information to lobby 
with, to begin with.  So, then I’m kind of doing the catch-up game, and trying to make 
sure that the information that we do get is fair and accurate, because then it’s going to 
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 Similarly, an interviewee discussed how federally based research often will not 
be accepted in California, because legislators or regulators “want it to be some 
asking 
for new protection.  I think that is just the nature of California and where 
 are not very pro-business, and 
we are not very pro-agriculture, as a whole. (6) 
Califor yists. 
 
Who Lobbyists Are Most Trying to Influence 
s.  
Interviewees were as y researching any 
given i
ve agencies 
 purposes-
lves and 
g 
ting pure scientific or technical 
information, and 3) lobbying the government and the industry for research funding. 
California-based opinion” (2).  Another lobbyist stated, 
more often than not, unfortunately, we are defending [issues] instead of 
California has been and where we are going.  We
 
nia’s political environment influenced many of the responses given by lobb
Results for Objective #1 – Purposes for Which Lobbyists Use Information and 
Lobbyists of agricultural interest groups research issues for a variety of reason
ked for what purposes they were most commonl
ssue.  Results indicated that lobbying and political purposes were the number one 
purpose for which lobbyists researched information.  In order of frequency, the most 
commonly-mentioned purposes were:  1) lobbying legislators 
(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15), 2) responding to members’ requests 
(3,5,6,8,9,10,12,13,14), 3) lobbying regulators and administrati
(1,2,4,5,11,12,13), 4) public education and awareness (3,4,5,8), 5) political
campaigns, elections, appointments, etc. (4,12,15), and 6) to educate themse
develop their own understanding of an issue (4,7,9).   
Other purposes mentioned by more than one interviewee included:  1) gatherin
supplemental information for a coalition bill, 2) collec
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Purposes for researching that were mentioned by only one lobbyist were:  regular
communication to members, responding to Federal Register postings, “backgrounding”
an issue and researching its effects on the organization’s members, lobbying legislati
 
 
ve 
staff, p
heir organization’s efforts began with member 
se 
r did not mention being involved in public 
and 
awareness.  And maybe that’s because we spend 80% of our time defending 
ore 
positive.  I think there’s a general awareness of the industry that more needs to be 
done….with limited dollars, you can’t afford to be out promoting something that 
While 
legislat ore of 
their tim
 Some lobbyists did not engage in research for certain purposes simply because it 
was not their role to do so within the organization.  Two lobbyists specifically stated that 
reparing legislation, and litigation. 
 Lobbyists’ research in response to member requests was typically regarding a 
regulation or requirement that the member needed to understand or comply with.  Two 
interviewees specifically stated that all of t
requests in some way.  As one lobbyist stated, “for us everything should start in respon
to member requests or concerns” (12). 
 Public education and awareness included publications, news stories, and action 
alerts produced by organizations.  Similar to being proactive versus reactive on 
legislative efforts, many lobbyists eithe
education at all or noted that they should be more involved.  One lobbyist stated,   
we probably spend, as an industry, far too little time on public education 
ourselves, that we don’t find the time to try and get out and do something m
done [with public education and awareness], but I doubt more will be 
you may lose in court. (15) 
 
other lobbyists did not explicitly say this, many of them alluded to the fact that 
ive, regulatory, and judicial defense efforts were consuming more and m
e. 
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other people within their organizations handled member education, or public relations 
work (6,10).  One senior lobbyist stated, “I don’t do too much research anymore.  And 
say that wit
I 
h some humbleness, but we have a pretty good staff that does most of the 
nt 
e entirety of how an 
n 
t 
] 
y 
as 
I lobby the institutions to 
come u
research” (14).  So, while the lobbyist interviewed might not research for a particular 
purpose, their organization might still be very involved in that area. 
 Research was explained as an on-going process by some lobbyists, three of 
whom specifically cited researching to increase their own understanding of issues.  
Lobbyists described how often times many people and programs are working on 
different facets of one issue, without knowing what the others are doing.  It is importa
for lobbyists to be able to make those connections and understand th
issue is being addressed.  One lobbyist also researched to understand the history of a
issue.  Research is also needed to be aware of changing regulations.  As one lobbyis
stated, “[research for policy] is an on-going effort….[it is] on-going research [and
trying to keep up with the latest trends in the [issue] area.  [Issue area] law is constantly 
changing, whether it’s at the federal level or state level” (9). 
One lobbyist had unique research challenges with an issue.  The challenge was 
that there was little to no science regarding the issue for which regulations had recentl
been introduced.  The science that was available was very dated.  So, that lobbyist w
“lobbying to get the science and to get that little bit of time before the regulations 
come….I’m lobbying the agency to give us some reprieve….
p with the science; I have to lobby the industry to help come up with some 
matching funds” (2).  Similarly, another lobbyist discussed how their organization 
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financed and facilitated scientific research that was needed for a specific issue being 
regulated:  “Unfortunately, the government does not feel a responsibility to go out 
pay for the most current research when all of these listing requests, these petitions, com
in – so industry has to do it” (12). 
One lobbyist did a lot of research on budgetary issues because of California
budget problems in the past few years.  The lobbyist recognized that funding and bud
concerns were going to be central to basically every issue in the legislative and 
regulatory process (7).  Therefore, the lobbyist found budget research important for 
many issues their organization add
and 
e 
’s 
get 
ressed. 
 
others 
em to discuss a different, yet still relevant, 
s 
as 
ortest 
 
ch, 
Interviewees addressed the question of what purposes they researched for in a 
variety of ways.  Some simply said that “it depended.”  Some specifically gave an 
ordered answer of what they were most commonly researching issues for, while 
responded in no particular order.  A few interviewees did not directly answer the 
question.  Instead, the question prompted th
issue.  Rather than give specific purposes, a few lobbyists addressed the broader reason
for why they would be researching.  For example, one lobbyist stated, “because it h
some effect on either a pending administrative or legislative action” (11).  Another 
lobbyist’s job was described as to “gather as much current data available in the sh
time [I] have to make a decision….trying to do what’s right based upon the best 
information that [I] can get in that period of time” (12). 
 This question highlighted a primary difference between employee and contract
lobbyists.  Namely, employee lobbyists discussed more scientific or technical resear
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while contract lobbyist discussed more political strategy research.  Contract lobbyists 
depend on their clients to provide the technical and scientific aspects of issues.  T
relationships between employee lobbyists and their organ
he 
ization’s members were similar 
to that of contract lobbyists and their clients.   
 
Who Lobbyists Are Most Trying to Influence 
 Toward the end of the interview, lobbyists were asked whom they were most 
trying to influence.  These answers complemented those given for what purposes they 
were researching issues (discussed in the previous section).  In order of frequency, 
terviewees said they were most trying to influence:  1) legislators 
inistrators, or appointed officials 
ver 
re most trying to 
 
d on the situation.  For example, if it was a piece of legislation moving through 
e leg it 
On the other hand, if the organization was initiating a proactive piece of 
in
(1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9,10,12,13,15); 2) regulators, adm
(1,4,5,7,8,9,10,12,15); 3) the public, often through the media (1,2,8,9,11,12); 4) whoe
the “decision-maker” is (3,5,7,11,14); 5) legislative staff (3,4,5); and 6) the governor 
(5,9).   
 Answers given by only one lobbyist regarding whom they we
influence included legal officials through litigation and their own organization’s 
membership. 
 Again, lobbyists often indicated that whom they were most trying to influence
depende
th islature, lobbyists would potentially need to influence the author, the committee 
was being heard in, legislative staff, other interest groups, the public, or other 
stakeholders.  
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legislation they might need to influence their own membership, other interest groups, t
public, and find a legislator to author the bill.  One lobbyist stated, 
generally it’s somebody else who’s got to make a decision in my favor, and that’s 
maker that’s out of your direct control, but is going to make the key dec
 
he 
the key part of it: you got to figure out in each situation, who’s the decision-
ision on 
this issue.  And, then that’s who you’re trying to get. (4) 
Another lobbyist said, “I don’t think it’s an individual.  It’s a series of steps.  And those 
steps, I think to me, hold the same significance.  And the fact that in our business, every 
body is making a decision” (5).  Many lobbyists simply answered that, in each situation, 
they w
 l different arenas in the 
d these different 
y 
at occurs is as a 
ould be trying to influence whoever the decision maker was. 
Lobbyists operate on several different levels and in severa
work that they do.  One lobbyist noted the differences between various decision-making 
environments:  “You’ve got to deal with the Administration, you’ve got to deal with the 
Assembly, and you’ve got to deal with the Senate.  And, all three are separate little 
siphons that the issue is fought out in” (7).  Lobbyists must understan
environments in order to effectively influence each of them as needed. 
 In total, the interviewees most commonly said legislators were whom they were 
most trying to influence.  However, influencing regulators was the second most 
frequently mentioned.  Many lobbyists commented on the evolution of the regulator
process in that lobbyists must now be very aware of both proposed regulations and 
proposed legislation.  As one lobbyist stated, “the reality is much of wh
result of those who are appointed to different positions in any administration – to get 
things done for you or against you” (12). 
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 The public was also identified by lobbyists as an important group to influenc
One lobbyist said, “we are trying to sway public opinion….because our adversaries are 
out there constantly maligning us in the press and in the media” (8).  Some lobbyists 
discussed influencing the public through t
e.  
he media and other public awareness 
ampai  
u 
en to 
elieve, could benefit from trying to influence the 
general public more.  But, the issues have now become so immense and the 
e 
finding that they have to focus their times on government and legal issues, and 
who’s to say that in this state of 30 million people, anyone cares?  So, why don’t 
the places where you may have some impact – and that’s the 
legislature and the legal – and just go for it. (15) 
So, wh ny 
reveale
their at
 
 
 
 
c gns.  Others specifically discussed the public as being constituents of legislators,
and that they should be influenced accordingly.  One lobbyist used research “to 
influence definitely the legislators, and you hope that that gets played out in press.  Yo
are going to be using those examples, and then you hope that that trickles out th
constituents, to the general public” (2). 
 Many lobbyists again noted they should probably be doing more in terms of 
public outreach, but that lobbying responsibilities consumed the majority of their time.  
One lobbyist stated, 
now, the industry as a whole, I b
landscape in the legislature so difficult, that I think more and more of them ar
that’s taken away from their public awareness, their education issues.  And, 
you focus on 
 
ile some interest groups indicated they were involved in public education, ma
d that the regulatory, legislative, and judicial arenas were where they focused 
tention and resources. 
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Results for Objective #2 – Sources of Information Utilized by Lobbyists 
Lobbyists of agricultural interest groups potentially utilize any number of sour
for researching and lobbying i
 
ces 
ssues.  Lobbyists were asked what sources they used to 
ain information needed in their research.  After providing initial answers, lobbyists 
were then given a list of possible sources and asked if the list prompted them to think of 
any add
provide
list of 
 of 
 or clients; commodity, trade, or 
ther agricultural organizations; and media or public news sources.  
Source
g
itional sources they used.  See Appendix B for the list of possible sources 
d to interviewees.  Table 4 provides a summary of sources of information 
mentioned by lobbyists pre-list, post-list, and in total. 
 
Sources of Information mentioned Pre-list 
The six sources most frequently mentioned by lobbyists prior to seeing the 
possibilities included:  regulatory or government agency staff; Internet; University
California or other academia; members of organization
o
 
s of Information Mentioned Post-list 
Although lobbyists provided a number of sources of information that they use 
prior to being given the list of possibilities, the list still prompted many lobbyists to 
remember other sources they use.  The six most frequently mentioned sources of 
inform ter seeing the list included:  activist or opposing groups; 
colleagues; commodity, trade, and other agricultural organizations; professional or  
 
ation cited by lobbyists af
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Table 4 
Source
 
 
leagues 2 7 9
nternal advisory committees 2 6 8
Private, technical, scientific consultants 3 4 7
ic news sources 5 2 7
Professional, scientific journals or digests 7 7
3 6
1 5
Legal consultants 5 5
UC Cooperative Extension - research & staff 1 4 5
Ag industry coalitions 2 2 4
Regulatory agency reports, publications 3 3
Allied industries, organizations, stakeholders 3 3
Industry newspapers,  trade publications 1 2 3
Colleagues, staff within own organization 2 1 3
National, sister organizations 3 3
"Everything on list" 3 3
Internal Board of Directors meetings 1 1 2
Books 2 2
General public 2 2
Group's clients 2 2
Federal government 2 2
Laws, codes of regulation 2 2
Internal evaluations, critiques 1 1
articles, published papers 1 1
Legal treasises 1 1
Marketing orders 1 1
Private research 1 1
Elected officials 1 1
Ag commissioners 1 1
State Fund 1 1
Attorney's General's opinions 1 1
Assessor's handbooks and publication 1 1
Land use reference guides 1 1
s of Information Utilized by Lobbyists 
Sources of Information Pre-List 
Total
Post-List 
Total
Total 
Mentioned 
Regulatory, government agency staff 11 3 14
Internet search 9 3 12
Commodity, trade, other ag organizations 5 7 12
University of California, academia 8 4 12
Members of organization 6 6 12
Activist, opposing groups 3 10 13
Col
I
Media, publ
Legislative, committee staff or analyses 3
People familiar with issue, experts, specialists 4
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scientific journals and digests; members of their organization; and internal advisory 
committees. 
 
Compared Pre-list and Post-list Information Sources 
When comparing the pre-list answers to the post-list answers, there are some 
trends worth noting.  More lobbyists mentioned using the Internet before being given the 
list (9 pre-list vs. 3 post-list).  A large group of lobbyists said regulatory and government 
agency staff was a source of information for them before seeing the list (11 pre-list vs. 3 
post-list).  One lobbyist stated, “I feel that often times the regulators can be very good, 
accurate sources of the facts and occasionally background as to who, what, and why they 
did it this way” (10).  Lobbyists made similar comments about legislative staff: 
I mentioned utilizing legislative staff as a source of information, and a lot of 
people don’t realize how important legislative staff are to the 
process….consultants to the committees [are important because they] have long 
tenure in their position and have the institutional memory of the legislature.  
They are very important to use as a source of information. (9) 
 
More lobbyists mentioned the University of California or academia as a source before 
being give the list (8 pre-list vs. 4 post-list).  One lobbyist commented,  
I always go to the university source – number one.  As you spend time in your 
area, you to tend to find…the scientists.  Either you knew them from your 
background or you learned them as you spent time looking at what research is 
there and what research is not there, and finding out who’s involved with it. (2) 
 
 
sed and had not mentioned prior to seeing the list.  More lobbyists 
entioned opposing or activist groups after being given the list (3 pre-list vs. 10 post-
 Comparatively, the list of possible sources did help some lobbyists remember
sources they u
m
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list).  More lobbyists said they used professional or scientific journals and digests after 
seeing ts 
 
 be the 
same.  
inform
 hen they 
mentioned members of their organization and internal advisory committees as sources 
they used.  Most recognized them as important sources of information, especially in 
regard to how laws and regulations impacted the industry “on the ranch.”  For example, 
one lob
farmers  
about how something’s impacting them” (14).  Others specifically noted that the 
organization’s strategic plan and policy priorities were decided by the membership.  
However, the pre/post frequency count for members of the organization mentioned as 
sources was equal (6 pre-list vs. 6 post-list).  In comparison, more lobbyists mentioned 
internal advisory committees as an information source after seeing the list (2 pre-list vs. 
6 post-list).  Once prompted, most lobbyists discussed the importance of internal 
the list (0 pre-list vs. 7 post-list).  More lobbyists said they used legal consultan
as sources of information after seeing the list (0 pre-list vs. 5 post-list).  After reading the 
list, three lobbyists specifically said they use “everything on the list.” 
 While the pre/post list frequency count was similar for other commodity and 
trade organizations (5 pre-list vs. 7 post-list), more lobbyists mentioned colleagues after
seeing the list (2 pre-list vs. 7 post-list).  This is likely explained by the fact that several 
lobbyists commented they considered colleagues and other trade organizations to
In addition, some lobbyists discussed coalitions as a separate source of 
ation, while others treated it the same as colleagues and other organizations.  
There were some differences amongst interviewees regarding w
byist stated, “there’s no better spokesperson for the industry other than the 
 themselves, and they’re the ones that can provide us with the direct information
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advisory committees for facilitating issue discussion and setting policy for the 
organization.  Similarly, contract lobbyists discussed their clients much like employee 
t 
 
es 
) and 
 
it.  
a” are 
 
 even 
lobbyists discussed their members:  as important sources of information.  One lobbyis
said, “I rely on my clients, more than anything, for background information and 
research….I rely on them to give me the information – the technical information – that’s
needed, and I’ll turn that into political information, or I’ll turn that into lobbying 
information” (15). 
 After seeing the list of potential sources, some lobbyists said there were sourc
they did not use.  Three lobbyists said they did not use marketing orders (8,11,13
three lobbyists said they did not use the general public (7,8,13).  Two lobbyists claimed
they did not use the media or public news sources (12,15), while another rarely used 
 A few lobbyists commented on the quality of various sources of information.  
Specifically, some lobbyists noted that activist groups or groups “running an agend
poor information sources.  One lobbyist said, “what I’ve found is that news websites that
are dedicated to environmental news are really, really bad.  Very spotty coverage;
if they’re not slanted one way or another, you really don’t learn much” (4).  Another 
lobbyist commented, regarding a government program, “they are not my most trusted 
source because there [are] researchers working in that unit who would couch their 
information.  So, they had a particular agenda” (3). 
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Total Sources of Information Mentioned 
 If a lobbyist mentioned a source prior to seeing the list and after seeing th
the source was identified as having been mentioned before seeing the list.  Many 
lobbyists would repeat sources because they were simply reading the list aloud wh
contemplating whic
e list, 
ile 
h sources they used.  No sources were identified as being mentioned 
 
tegy of finding needed information 
as discussed by every lobbyist. 
ation, not only to make decisions from, but 
release 
both “pre-list” and “post-list” by any one lobbyist.  This allowed for an accurate 
frequency count of the total sources of information mentioned by all lobbyists.  In order
of frequency, the top five total information sources mentioned by lobbyists were:  
regulatory and government agency staff; activist or opposing groups; Internet search; 
commodity, trade, or other agricultural organizations; University and academia; and 
members of their organization.  
 
Results for Objective #3 – Reasons Why Lobbyists Utilize Different Information 
Sources and Lobbyists’ Information Finding Strategies 
 Lobbyists research issues and utilize information sources for a variety of 
purposes.  These purposes are revealed by how lobbyists select their information 
sources, and the reasons they choose them.  This stra
w
 Lobbyists need to find good inform
also because that information will ultimately be part of the information their 
organization releases.  Organizations need to be diligent that the information they 
is correct and accurate.  This is true whether the information is being disseminated 
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through the legislative process, the regulatory process, to members, as publications, or 
by any other means of communication.  Many lobbyists stated they would choose
sources based on who would give them accurate and appropriate information.  Lobbyists 
also noted the importance of getting information from more than one source, in ord
ensure accuracy and credibility (5,7,10).  Lobbyists said sources of information needed
to be widely recognized as credible (1,2,5,12). 
Lobbyists noted the impo
 their 
er to 
 
rtance of “doing their homework” to be sure they 
nderstand all sides and all aspects of an issue (2,4,5,10,12,13,14).  Lobbyists said they 
wan  
lobbyist said, “y ng a good 
ere 
arted 
e process of finding information was really an “issue-
n 
ing needed 
ine 
, 
u
ted the real facts, and would be exhaustive in their research to get those facts.  One
ou have to be honest.  One of the fundamental parts of bei
lobbyist is knowing your stuff” (7).  To find needed information, some lobbyists w
more inclined to immediately pick up the phone and call someone, while others st
by reading to familiarize themselves with issues.   
 Some lobbyists said that th
based pursuit,” and spoke of the dependency of the issue and situation (1,2,4,14).  Give
that, many interviewees provided good examples of how they went about find
information. 
 One lobbyist always begins researching an issue by having “a session to def
exactly what the problem is” (11).  This is done so everyone agrees on what the issue is
how they are going to address it, and, therefore, what information is needed.  Similarly, 
another lobbyist discussed the importance of identifying the purpose of research before 
beginning.  The lobbyist said, “look at the audience, try to determine what their hot 
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buttons are, and try to ensure that you get research that is appropriate to them” (12).  Yet
another lobbyist discussed how their organizatio
 
n’s strategic plan dictated much of what 
issues they addressed and how they addressed them (14). 
 
Scientific/Technical Research vs. Political/Strategic Research 
 Interviewees differentiated between scientific, or technical, information and 
political, or strategic, information they were researching for.  Examples of scientific or 
technical information are the actual codes or regulations, the science of an issue (such as
biology, physics, environmental science, etc.), or h
 
ow a specific process or system 
ind out both types of information.  One lobbyist distinguished the two 
 
what are the facts surrounding the science of an issue, if that’s appropriate, or 
science and just hard, basic research data – science. (12)   
 In addition, many lobbyists discussed using their members as a “reality check” as 
to how regulations or laws are being enacted in the field.  Lobbyists talk to members to 
understand how regulations impact them, the actual farmers (1,4,5,6,10,14).  This helps 
lobbyists make sure they are headed in the right direction as they work different issues.  
It also helps lobbyists know how regulations are being implemented at the local level, 
and if there is consistency across the state.  One lobbyist noted the importance of 
operates.  Examples of political or strategic information are which legislators or 
regulators support or oppose an issue, which interest groups support or oppose an issue, 
or what the opposition is saying about an issue.  Lobbyists emphasized that it was 
important to f
types of research this way: 
In gathering research, in gathering information, you will do research to determine
what are the facts around the politics of the issue?  So you’re talking political 
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member testimony:  “Being able to tell a story or to put a face on the issue and to really 
ably the most successful 
rgume
, to 
y 
ere 
al/strategic research, while other employees of their 
organiz
 
Scienti echnical Research
be able to show and prove personal impact of some type is prob
a nt” (6). 
Most lobbyists do a combination of scientific/technical research and 
political/strategic research.  However, contract lobbyists were more likely to research 
more political/strategic information than scientific/technical information.  They 
depended on their clients, who were often agricultural interest groups themselves
provide the scientific/technical research that was needed.  Employee lobbyists were 
more likely to do a combination of both scientific and political research, unless the
were in a more administrative position within their organization.  In that case, they w
more involved in the politic
ation gathered scientific/technical information. 
fic/T  
 Many lobbyists discussed the need to find and use peer-reviewed, scientific data 
in their lobbying efforts.  Many regulations are based on assumptions about how human 
activity is impacting various environmental systems.  However, scientific or technical 
research is needed to prove these assumptions.  As mentioned previously, 13 of the 15 
interviewees specifically mentioned going to universities or cooperative extension 
research for this scientific or technical information. 
 Some lobbyists who were involved in highly technical, scientific issues noted 
that much of their information finding strategy involved trying to get credible research 
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funded as 
 
ncies, 
hen 
 
r experts in specific areas to 
nderstand scientific or technical processes.  In many cases, these experts are then 
elp provide testimony or other evidence in the regulatory 
 and completed for the issues they were working on.  Their concern w
regulations were being passed without the scientific research to prove regulations were
even appropriate.  So, lobbyists spoke of working with industry, government age
and research universities to have research conducted on those issues (2,12).  In this 
situation, one lobbyist noted the importance of considering the goal of the research w
finding a source of information:  “Timing.  Who does it?  What’s the use of it?  [The]
ultimate goal?  What are you trying to accomplish?  Determine those things before you 
make a decision on who’s going to do your research” (12). 
 Lobbyists contact scientists, consultants, or othe
u
retained by interest groups to h
or legislative process.   
 
Political/Strategic Research 
 A large part of political and strategic research is finding out where and why ther
is political will behind a particular issue.  Specifically, lobbyists need to know whic
legislators are supporting, opposing, or not being inv
e 
h 
olved in an issue, and why 
have 
 
(4,7,10,11,12,13,15).  When a bill is introduced, lobbyists need to find out what the 
intentions of it are (13).  As one contract lobbyist stated, “the first thing I’m thinking 
about is politics.  I’m thinking about what committees will the bill go to; do we 
leverage in a committee?  And, how do we do that?  Then I’ll get into the research on 
developing arguments or writing letters for clients” (15).  Based on the partisan make-up
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of the California legislature, one lobbyist said, “it’s critically important to be able to
information out of Democrat staff.  And, that’s where you learn things like ‘what are the 
other guys saying?’” (4). 
 One lobbyist said their organization subscribed to a service that provided detailed
demographic information about legislators (11).  This inform
 get 
 
ation can be helpful in 
rmin
ing to 
be received by an urban legislature; how is it going to be received by Democrats 
people in the key committees going to respond? (11) 
obbyists suggested that this kind of political research is often just as important, if not 
ic research. 
 
yist said, 
s 
en 
 
fferent from being a lawyer in this respect:  When you deal 
with a dispute in court, everybody has to lay their arguments out and you get a 
fo g political strategy.  As this lobbyist suggested,  
often times that’s what we’re really trying to research – how is this issue go
of all stripes, and, more importantly, [by] the Republicans, and then how are the 
 
L
more important, than scientif
 Many lobbyists discussed understanding the history and current status of an 
issue, and where, when, and who might bring it up.  As one lobbyist said, “part of this
job – you have to anticipate where the action is going to be” (7).  The same lobb
“sometimes you just have to know how to ask the right questions” (7).  The lobbyist’
point was that, in researching, lobbyists spend time identifying what they need, and th
how they can best find that information.  Another lobbyist tries to get “as clear and as 
broad a picture of the political lay of the land,” in order to know how to best proceed 
with an issue (10). 
 Part of a lobbyist’s strategic research is figuring out what the opposition is saying
and knowing how to counter it.  As one lobbyist explained, 
lobbying is a lot di
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chance to see what the other person is saying and evaluate what their evidence is, 
So, there is a lot of investigation that has to go into figuring out what the othe
 
and attack it.  In the political processes, you rarely have an opportunity to do that.  
r 
folks are saying. (4) 
 
always
ct-based, credible argument can lose in the political arena.  As one lobbyist said, 
important role.  But, still, this is politics.  And, the best facts don’t always win in 
ways win in politics.  So, again, it comes down 
to strategy, it comes down to who you know. (15) 
re 
right but you know you don’t have the votes.  There is nothing you can do about 
That’s just the way it is. (7) 
Another lobbyist told an anecdotal story about a legislator who jokingly commented to a 
testifier during a committee hearing, “this is where you’re making your big mistake.  
You’re operating under the delusion that we make decisions in this Capitol based on 
logic.  Nothing could be further from the truth” (14).  While this story had been shared 
for humor sake, and the legislator had said it tongue in cheek, many interviewees 
provide t 
they m
political/strategic information. 
 
Political and strategic research is important because political decisions are not 
 based on scientific facts.  Lobbyists pointed out that even the best-researched, 
fa
[scientific/technical] research plays not the most critical role.  It plays an 
politics.  The best story doesn’t al
 
Many lobbyists mentioned the frustration associated with politically-based decisions 
made in legislative and regulatory arenas.  One lobbyist quipped, 
sometimes you are going to go into a legislative situation where you know you’
it.  So, you make your argument, thank you very much, then you get whupped.  
 
d comments suggesting that it may be true.  Because of this, lobbyists noted tha
ust do their due diligence in researching both scientific/technical information and 
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The “I Just Know” Factor 
 Many lobbyists, especially the more experienced ones, responded that they “jus
knew” where to go for information (1,2,5,7,8,9,11,12,13,14).  As one lobbyist said, 
t 
“the 
simple ow.  I 
just kn
e people or other information sources involved, or with similar situations.  Many 
 
finding
helpful to you – and that just is a function of time and experience” (7), and that “you’re 
guided by your understanding of the issues as to where to go for information” (1).  
Lobbyists described an “intuition” of where to go for the information they needed (1,14). 
 Lobbyists said if they didn’t immediately know whom to ask, they would do an 
Internet search or start asking people to find out who’s worked on the issue.  Many 
claimed they either knew whom to call or knew someone who could tell them whom to 
call.  From there, lobbyists said they would discover other people to talk to and other 
documents to read.  As one lobbyist said, “then, you kind of keep heading down the path 
based on the information you get from other people” (3).  Lobbyists pointed out that 
once they began researching an issue, one information source would lead to another. 
 
answer and the honest answer in my case, is I’ve been around so long, I kn
ow” (13).  Lobbyists know because of previous experience with the issue, with 
th
lobbyists said they would simply “call someone they knew had worked on the issue” 
(2,5,7,14). 
The institutional memory of lobbyists was clearly a factor in their information 
 strategy.  Lobbyists stated, “you just develop a bank of knowledge that’s very 
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The Role of Contacts and Personal Relationships 
 All 15 interviewees said contacts and personal relationships were important to 
their information finding process.  This included personal relationships with other 
lobbyists, with regulators, legislators, legislative staff, university researchers and 
extension specialists, and many others.  When asked how they went about finding 
 
  
the 
xchanged amongst the people that you trust within the industry.  I trust certain people to 
give me accurate in n, I’m used in the 
ame m
needed information, one lobbyist said, “the easiest thing to do is just call up one of my
colleagues, who I know has worked on the issue and I know I can trust him or her” (7).
One lobbyist said that if they didn’t know exactly whom to call, they would look up the 
University department that worked in that area, call it, and find out who worked on 
issue (2).     
 When asked about sources of information used and characteristics of sources 
used, many lobbyists continued to comment about the role of personal contacts and 
relationships.  “[Where you go for information is] built largely on your knowledge of 
people and day-to-day contacts” (1).  Personal contacts and relationships were clearly 
vital to the information finding strategies of lobbyists.   
Lobbyists discussed the transactional nature of their relationships with people 
they used as information sources (4,5,9,10,15).  One lobbyist said, “[information] is 
e
formation, or tell me where I can get it.  And, in tur
s anner” (5). 
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Coalitions:  California Agricultural Interest Groups  Working Together 
 Coalitions were identified by lobbyists as an effective way to share and receive 
information with many people in one place.  Many lobbyists cited working with 
coalitions, or groups of other organizations, as an important part of their information 
finding strategy (1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14).  Whether it was specifically an 
agricultural coalition, or a broad cross-industry coalition, lobbyists commented on their 
es, 
 
n, depending on what it is we 
are wo
.  
s is I’m a pretty good starting pitcher, and I can finish most games, 
ut sometimes you need a closer.  And it’s because of some special niche” (13).  The 
embers of a variety 
e 
 
 issues.  
usefulness as a source for information, for contacts, and for combining resources to 
mount coordinated efforts and campaigns.  Coalitions work together “comparing not
getting input, and then meeting and discussing a common position” (1).  When 
discussing how they found needed information, one lobbyist specifically stated, “if the
issue warrants a coalition, then I’ll put together a coalitio
rking on, and bring together all those that have a specialty in that area” (5). 
Coalitions provide a broader array of contacts for each interest group involved
Lobbyists may ask someone to join their coalition solely for the contacts they have; 
because they need those contacts to fill a niche in their strategy.  As one lobbyist said, 
“what I tell my guy
b
same lobbyist used this rationale to explain why farmers should be m
of organizations:  “It’s important to support…a multitude of groups because people hav
different expertise, different contacts” (13). 
Both the general farm organizations and the commodity-specific organizations
discussed how California agricultural interest groups commonly work together on
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Commodity-specific organizations will take the lead on issues specific to their 
commodity, with the general farm organizations supporting them.  For example, the 
California Association of Winegrape Growers would take the lead on an issue affecting 
winegrape growers, and the other organizations would support where needed.  S
the general farm organizations would typically take the lead on issues that affect the 
entire agriculture industry, regardless of commodity.  For example, the California Farm
Bureau Federation would take the lead on air quality issues, with commodity 
imilarly, 
 
organiz
] 
r 
peting for the 
same d
w they 
ing 
here?’  This is where ag groups tend to not necessarily always be on the same 
 
ations providing support specific to their industries where needed.  As one 
lobbyist said, their organization is “frequently talking with [other agricultural groups
about what their position [is], because in ag, as few as we are, we need to work togethe
as much as we can to make sure we aren’t at cross purposes” (12). 
 However, some lobbyists also commented about situations and reasons where 
agricultural organizations do not cooperate.  Lobbyists pointed to the competitive nature 
of groups, and the differences between specific commodity organizations and general 
farm organizations.  As one lobbyist said, “lots of these groups are com
ollars, so that sometimes gets in the way of sharing information and working 
together.  Because everybody wants to take credit for that good thing that got done” (13).  
Another potential area of disagreement amongst agricultural organizations is ho
choose to address proposed legislation.  In discussing agricultural organizations work
collectively on a defensive issue, one lobbyist pointed out that,  
groups will split on this – at what point do you say, ‘okay, we are willing to give 
page.  Some will take a harder line than others. (7)   
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So, while lobbyists mentioned other agricultural organizations and coalitions as 
important in their information finding strategies, they also noted the diverse na
these groups occasionally restricts information flow and impedes collective progres
 
Results for Objective #4 – Common Characteristics of Information Sources  
Utilized by Lobbyists 
ture of 
s. 
he 
 
 their research 
(4,5,10
ke your decision.  So time 
ight dictate, to a certain extent, how much research you can do, how much 
 
ompact, easy to read, and distilled lots of information down to main points.   
 
 The information sources a lobbyist chooses to use are based largely on the 
characteristics of those sources.  Lobbyists were asked what characteristics or features of 
information sources make them easier to contact or gain information from.  I grouped t
interviewees’ responses into categories of characteristics.  Table 5 provides a summary 
of common characteristics of information sources utilized by lobbyists.  In order of 
frequency, the five most common characteristics included:  trustworthiness and 
credibility, lobbyist had a contact or personal relationship with source, accessibility and
helpfulness, quality and accuracy, and readability and brevity. 
 Many lobbyists specifically mentioned time as a factor in
,12).  As one lobbyist said,  
you are limited in the amount of time you have to ma
m
information you can gather, how much time you have to analyze it. (12) 
Therefore, lobbyists used sources that were easily accessible, and that they could find 
information from quickly.  Similarly, lobbyists discussed needing sources that were 
c
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Table
Common Characteristics of Infor  by Lobbyists 
 
 
When discussing a specific issue, one lobbyist commented, “I figured out who could 
provide me with the specific information I needed without having to read those 7,000 
pages of documents.  Because in this job, you don’t have time to do that” (6).  It is 
importa e 
that information in their arguments.  As one lobbyist pointed out, “you can have too 
much information too.  At some point, you’ve got to make your argument and your 
argument has got to be fairly simple” (7), and “don’t get too stuck in the minutia of the 
information where you lose the ability to make a good point” (7). 
 Lobbyists often must go to different sources for scientific/technical information 
than for political/strategic information.  When asked about characteristics of information 
sources, some lobbyists mentioned sources that could provide scientific, technical, or 
statistical information (1,2).  Others specifically mentioned looking for “definitive 
information,” such as statistics (1).  In general, lobbyists were looking for sources that 
Current 2
Sincerity 1
 5 
mation Sources Utilized
Characteristics Total 
Trustworthiness, credible, reputable, objective 15
Related to contacts or relationships 12
Easily accessible, helpfulness, timeliness, availability 9
Thorough, quality, accurate, facts, competence 9
Compact info, readability, understandable, brevity 3
Experienced, can tell you how it works 3
Scientifically-based 1
Pictures, graphics 1
Mentioned
nt for lobbyists to be able to find accurate information quickly, and to then us
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provided information they could use to write position letters, testimony, and other 
arguments to support their positions on issues. 
 Trust, or credibility, was a characteristic mentioned by every lobbyist in some 
way.  The role of trust in the selection of information sources is discussed in the next 
section.  Also, when discussing characteristics of sources utilized, many lobbyists made 
reference to their personal contacts and relationships.  While the role of contacts and 
relationships was discussed earlier, it is important to point out that they were also a 
characteristic of information sources named by lobbyists. 
 
Results for Objective #5 – The Role of Trust in the Selection of Information Sources 
 When asked about the characteristics of sources they utilized, lobbyists were also 
specifically asked if trust was a factor.  In answer to that question, 12 of 15 specifically 
said that, yes, trust was a factor.  Lobbyists made statements such as “trust is definitely a 
factor” (2), “trust is an overriding factor” (5), “absolutely, absolutely.  [Trust] is number 
one” (8), “trust is a huge factor” (10), and “obviously, trust is the most important factor” 
(12).  Those lobbyists who did not comment about trust in response to interview question 
four all commented on the role of trust at some other point during the interview. 
 Some lobbyists even discussed the importance of trust before I specifically asked 
about it (3,7,12).  One lobbyist discussed trust of sources four times before being asked 
specifically about it (3).    
Most lobbyists discussed trust and credibility interchangeably, and in regard to 
both people and documents or other written sources.  Many lobbyists also related their 
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comments about trusting information sources to the integrity of lobbyists.  Lobbyists 
must have integrity if they are to be trusted and be effective in their job.  As one lobby
stated,  
the one thing that a lobbyist has, that you cannot risk, is your integrity.  Once y
that is not going to be truthful, not going to be honest, you’re useless.  So, its
 
ist 
ou 
lose that, you can hardly get in the door anymore.  If you are known as someone 
 
very important to have integrity. (12) 
Lobbyists do extensive research in order to thoroughly understand issues, and to 
accurately represent their organization’s position.  Many lobbyists noted the importance 
of knowing all sides of an issue in order to prevent giving misinformation (3,4,5,7,9,12).  
Lobbyists provided comments such as, “you’re striving to get the right answers and to be 
truthful and honest” (9), and “it’s a credibility issue because ultimately I don’t make the 
decision, but I want to be perceived as giving valuable information” (10). 
 Trust, credibility, and integrity are all characteristics that come with time and 
experience.  It takes time and experience for a source to be viewed as trustworthy, and it 
takes time and experience for a lobbyist to trust that source.  As one lobbyist said, “you 
build trust on that person’s knowledge, their understanding of agricultural issues” (1). 
 Once again, contacts and personal relationships were discussed in relation to trust 
and credibility.  One lobbyist stated, “trust is a personal thing too.  Those people that I 
have developed those personal relationships with, and [I am] most comfortable with, I 
think those are the ones that I am more apt to go to first” (6).  The trust and integrity 
associated with personal relationships was a common characteristic mentioned by 
lobbyists. 
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The Importance of Research in Lobbyists’ Work 
 In concluding each interview, I asked the lobbyists if they could comment about 
the imp
researc  
nderstand an issue before lobbying on it, and 2) finding the appropriate information to 
support their organization’s policy objectives.  One lobbyist said,  
research is important to develop the basis for your arguments and to substantiate 
information and good sources of information to back up your policy position. (9) 
Another lobbyist’s response basically summed up the value of this study:  “my 
research…is paramount to my ability to move forward in my public affairs work.  It 
becomes almost the foundation on how I make my decisions on how to engage my plan” 
(5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ortance of research in the work they do.  Lobbyists discussed two main themes of 
h:  1) gathering all the political and technical information needed to thoroughly
u
your arguments.  In the legislative process, you want to be able to point to factual 
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CHAPTER V 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Discussion of Findings 
 
 As stated in the methodology, this study was designed as qualitative, exploratory
research.  As such, the study did not seek to prove or disprove a specific hypothesis.  It 
 
was im
and rep
re 
 are no well-defined comparisons to be made between the literature review and the 
sults of this study.  However, the results of this study did correlate to many themes and 
oncepts found in the literature regarding interest group theory. 
Findings Compared to Previous Research
portant to ask these questions in a research study in order to methodically record 
ort the findings.  The goal was then for these findings to contribute to existing 
interest group theory. 
As exploratory and qualitative research, there was no specific body of literatu
regarding information sources utilized by lobbyists to compare this study to.  Therefore, 
there
re
c
 
 
Elitism versus Pluralism 
Previous research (Browne, 1990; Dahl, 1961; Jordan, 2004; Polsby, 1963; 
Schattschneider, 1960) only alludes to the im ation sources in the 
success of elitism or pluralism.  I hypothesized that the information sources interest 
groups have access to, and the reasons why they choose some sources over others, might 
pact the success of elitism or pluralism.  However, none of the interviewees 
portance of inform
im
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mentioned that they did not have ac  sources that they needed in their 
research, which is a k fic or technical 
research was discussed as available to virtually anyone.  Political or strategic 
formation was recognized as a ld be more difficult to acquire.  
ure discussed the relationship between interest groups, legislative 
commi
gencies.  Six of 15 
terviewees mentioned legislative or committee staff as a source of information, and 14 
tory agencies were an information source they 
 
t upon 
cess to information
ey determining characteristic of elitism.  Scienti
in  rare commodity, that cou
Political and strategic information was primarily available only through relationships 
and contacts, where scientific/technical information was accessible in other ways. 
 
The Iron Triangle Concept 
Previous literat
ttees, and government regulatory agencies as “iron triangles” (Baumgartner & 
Leech, 1998; Browne, 1995, 2004c; Gais et al., 1984; Hamm, 1983; Hardin, 1978; Knott 
& Miller, 1987; Rourke, 1976; Thomas, 2004).  While the actual clout and control of 
iron triangles is continually debated, this study confirmed that interest groups are in 
regular contact with legislative staff and government regulatory a
in
of 15 interviewees said government regula
used. 
Exchange Theory 
Exchange theory describes the internal group dynamics of interest groups 
(Baumgartner & Leech, 2004; Browne, 1988; Salisbury, 1969; Thomas, 2004; Truman, 
1951).  The literature suggests the success of interest groups is highly dependen
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the exchanges between group leaders and members.  Interviewees confirmed that regular
communication with their organization’s members was important.  Many lobbyists 
discussed their research in light of the policy objectives determined by the org
membership.  Twelve of 15 lobbyists mentioned members as an information source, and 
eight of 15 mentioned internal advisory committees of members as an information 
source. 
 
anization’s 
).  
 
 
 in 
l. 
munication Process 
low of 
 
Transactional Theory 
The literature described the transactional relationship between interest groups 
and policymakers (Bauer et al., 1972; Browne, 1988, 1998; Hamm, 1983; Hayes, 1981
Browne (1988) stated, “transactional relationships are based primarily on the exchange 
of information” (p. 53).  Interestingly enough, the data from this study report that only
one interviewee mentioned legislators (“elected officials”) as an information source. 
This may be due to the fact that direct access to legislators has become more difficult
today’s complex political environment.  Also, legislators were not specifically suggested 
on the list of possible sources shown to interviewees, so that likely impacted responses 
as wel
 
Lobbying as a Com
Researchers (Milbrath, 1963; Rogers, 2003; Thomas, 2004) discussed the f
information and communication in the legislative decision-making process.  The review 
of literature defined the communication process as the dynamic interaction of 1) 
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information, and 2) relationships between people.  The results of this study confirmed 
that lobbyists’ interactions with others are based on relationships and information 
exchanged within those relationships. 
 
Information 
Previous literature (Milbrath, 1963; Rogers, 2003; Truman, 1951) and data from 
is study explain the importance of information for lobbyists.  One interviewee said,  
tarted to learn [that] information…is the money, the currency, 
around the Capitol.  ‘Have you heard this?’  ‘Have you heard that?’  So, there’s a 
d 
you information, you owe them stuff.  And, if you can develop information 
 
The literature agreed.  Hansen (1991) stated, 
in sum, interest groups are influential because they determine the kinds of 
e 
not.  They amplify voices; they articulate demands; they promote issues; they 
intelligence – not pressure. (p. 229) 
information and 2) scientific or technical information.  Previous literature 
apell & Thomas, 2004; Truman, 1951) also defined those two distinct types of 
tion process.  Capell and Thomas (2004) 
observe
. 
th
I’ve gradually s
pecking order, a power structure among the lobbying core.  People that can fee
sources that nobody else has…then you move up the totem pole amazingly. (4) 
information that are available to legislators and the kinds of information that ar
identify common interests.  Their stock in trade is information – political 
 
Interviewees discussed two kinds of information they need:  1) political or 
strategic 
(C
information important to the communica
d that employee lobbyists were more likely to be versed in scientific/technical 
information about their industry, while contract lobbyists were more likely to be experts 
in the political process.  This dynamic was confirmed by interviewees’ responses
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Relationships between People / Contacts 
Previous literature (Browne, 1988; Hansen, 1991; Milbrath, 1963; Rogers, 
Truman, 1951) recognized the importa
2003; 
nce of contacts and relationships in the exchange 
f information and in access to the decision-making process.  Data from this study 
ersonal relationships are also essential to obtaining sources of information.  
All 15 
specific
noted t
impede
(1995) research found that legislators criticized interest groups for 1) the conflict 
between group leaders and their grassroots members, and 2) not cooperating with other 
groups
agricul  
bjectives.  The challenges and successes of agricultural interest groups working 
togethe
ne 
, 
o
suggest that p
interviewees said contacts were important to their information finding strategy.  
Many interviewees also mentioned other agricultural organizations (12 of 15), or even 
ally coalitions (4 of 15), as information sources.  However, interviewees also 
hat the diverse nature of these groups occasionally restricts information flow and 
s collective progress.  Previous literature has suggested the same.  Browne’s 
 to reach consensus on issues.  Browne (1988, 1990, 1998) discussed how 
tural interest groups don’t always work together to achieve uniform policy
o
r continues to be a theme in interest group theory research. 
 
Objective #1 – Purposes for which Lobbyists Use Information 
Results indicated lobbying and political purposes were in fact the number o
purpose for which lobbyists researched information.  Previous research (Browne, 1988
1995; Capell & Thomas, 2004; Thomas, 2004) also suggests this was true. 
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Objective #2 – Sources of Information Utilized by Lobbyists 
 
d 
ctivist 
988) 
e for interest groups 
 share information.  The data suggest this is true as 12 of 15 interviewees noted they 
cifically discussed the 
use of c
h, 1998; 
rowne, 1995, 2004c; Gais et al., 1984; Hamm, 1983; Hardin, 1978; Knott & Miller, 
Previous research (Browne, 1990; Salisbury, 1969; Salisbury et al., 1987) only 
alluded to possible sources of information utilized by interest groups.  Those sources 
included:  1) lobbyists’ interaction with their organization’s members, and 2) 
communication between interest groups.  Milbrath (1963) specifically found groups’ 
members to be an important information source for lobbyists.  While more interviewees
in this study mentioned regulatory and government agency staff (14 of 15) and activist 
or opposing groups (13 of 15) as sources of information, group members (12 of 15) an
other agricultural or trade organizations (12 of 15) were two of the next most frequently 
mentioned sources.  Results clearly confirmed both group members and other 
agricultural organizations as important sources of information for lobbyists. 
Milbrath (1963) found that lobbyists used opposing groups as information 
sources.  This was confirmed by the data as 14 of the 15 interviewees mentioned a
or opposing groups as a source of information.  Lobbyists discussed the need to 
understand all sides of an issue in order to better prepare their position.  Browne (1
and Milbrath (1963) also identified coalitions as an important venu
to
rely on other organizations for information.  Some lobbyists spe
oalitions for information sharing and other purposes. 
 While regulatory and government agencies were not specifically cited in 
previous literature as an information source, research (Baumgartner & Leec
B
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1987; Rourke, 1976; Thomas, 2004) discussed the interactions between government 
agencie  
entioned 
 
ce of 
ists 
indicat
ation 
 
 
et to find government 
r actual 
s and interest groups.  As agriculture becomes a more highly regulated industry,
it makes sense that interest groups would communicate extensively with regulatory 
agencies.  Regulatory and government agency staff was the most commonly m
source of information by interviewees (14 of 15). 
The literature (Browne, 1995; Mibrath, 1963) identified scientific research results
as a common source of information utilized by lobbyists.  Research also has indicated 
that legislators considered scientific research an important aspect of any lobbyist’s 
presentation.  The data suggest that scientific research (University, academia, 
cooperative extension, private research, etc.) continues to be an important sour
information for lobbyists (mentioned by 12 of 15 interviewees).  Many lobby
ed the need for political decisions to be based on scientific data, and the 
frustration that often times these decisions are not. 
While no literature was found regarding the Internet as an important inform
source for agricultural interest groups, I predicted that it would be.  The data suggest that
to be true; 12 of 15 interviewees mentioned the Internet as a source of information.  
However, it is important to note that the Internet itself is not a source of information.  
Rather, it is a communication channel through which lobbyists can find sources.  Some
interviewees alluded to this by stating that they used the Intern
agency websites, specific reports or statistics, websites of organizations, and othe
sources of information. 
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Objective #3 – Reasons Why Lobbyists Utilize Different Information Sources and 
Lobbyists’ Information Finding Strategies 
 
 There has been little previous research on how and why lobbyists select their 
information sources.  Browne (1995) suggested that lobbyists are purposeful in their 
selection of information sources, and may deliberately choose not to use some sources.  
Data from this study suggest that lobbyists will go to any source to find the information 
they need.  Lobbyists do not deliberately avoid sources, unless they are not credible or 
useful to their research.  Lobbyists said they wanted the real facts, and would be 
exhaustive in their information finding strategy to get those facts.   
 
Objective #4 – Common Characteristics of Information Sources Utilized by Lobbyists 
 Lobbyists reported a variety of useful source characteristics that were helpful in 
their research.  Credibility was the number one characteristic that lobbyists said an 
information source must have.  Beyond that, lobbyists primarily noted the importance of 
source characteristics such as personal contacts (12 of 15), accessibility (9 of 15), quality 
and accuracy (9 of 15), brevity and readability (3 of 15), experience (3 of 15), and 
current information (2 of 15). 
 
Objective #5 – The Role of Trust in the Selection of Information Sources 
Previous research (Browne, 1995; Milbrath, 1963; Thomas, 2004) cited trust as a 
key factor in the selection of information sources.  Results of this study confirm that 
lobbyists consider trust and credibility the most important factors when selecting 
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information sources.  All 15 of the interviewees noted the importance of trust and/or 
wees also discussed the importance of 
bbyists’ integrity and of providing accurate information. 
 
The Importance of Research in Lobbyists’ Work 
 Lobbyist responses confirmed that research is important in the work they do 
representing their agricultural organizations.  Previous research (Capell & Thomas, 
2004; Rogers, 2003; Schlink, 1996; Truman, 1951) confirms the value of seeking 
accurate and thorough information to use in the legislative decision-making process. 
 
Conclusions 
 Lobbyists of California agricultural interest groups are primarily researching for 
lobbying purposes.  The purpose of their research and the type of information needed 
drive how lobbyists research an issue and what information sources they utilize.  
Lobbyists rely on their previous experiences to determine which sources will provide 
them with the necessary information.  Data from this study suggest four main factors that 
impact which information sources lobbyists choose to utilize: 
1) what information is needed 
 
2) who their contacts and personal relationships are with 
3) how much they trust potential sources 
 
credibility of information sources.  Intervie
lo
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4) other characteristics of the sources such as accessibility, quality and accuracy,
brevity and readability, experience of source, current information, scientific
based, sincere, and/or a source that provides needed
 
ally-
 pictures or graphics 
Lobbyists acknowledged the importance of research in their lobbying work.  
Specifically, two main themes developed from the interviewees’ responses:  1) lobbyists 
gather all the political and technical information needed to thoroughly understand an 
issue before lobbying on it, and 2) lobbyists find the appropriate information to support 
their organization’s policy objectives.   
 Lobbyists will exhaust their resources to find the necessary information.  
Lobbyists are very resourceful and diligent in their search for information.  I was 
impressed by the integrity of lobbyists, as they all discussed their desire to fully 
understand issues and promote good public policy decisions. 
 
 Legislators Æ Favored 
Information        (+Constituent Beliefs, etc.)      Legislation
 
 
his study sought to identify the initial sources of information (in bold italics above) 
sed by lobbyists, and why and how lobbyists choose those sources.  The findings from 
this study provided just that:  a breadth of data surrounding sources of information 
utilized by interest groups. 
 
Implications of Results and Contributions to Interest Group Theory 
 The communication process used in the legislative decision-making process is 
shown below: 
Sources of  Æ Interest Groups Æ  Information        Æ     
 
T
u
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While this flowchart suggests sources of information are being provided to 
 groups, that is typically not true.  This study researched how and why lobbyists 
 sought out information sources.  Depending on the issue they were resea
interest
actively rching, 
ometimes lobbyists needed specific information, while other times they began 
researching with only a general concept of what information was needed.   
As modeled in the flowchart, the sources of information used by lobbyists affect 
the lobbyists’ ability to influence legislators and the passage of favorable legislation.  
The initial sources of information used by lobbyists are key to lobbyists’ success in the 
political decision-making process.  
 The communication process demonstrated by the flow chart also indicates the 
importance of constituent beliefs in influencing legislators.  In an increasingly complex 
and busy political environment, more and more legislators focus only on 
communications from their constituents.  Members of interest groups are also 
constitue group’s 
embe
study confirm that lobbyists depend on their organization’s membership 
 
emented “on the farm,” and how regulations impacted their businesses.  
Many lobbyists noted the effectiveness of having members “tell their story” to articulate 
and personalize testimony. 
Interest group theory is broad and diverse; there are a number of variables and 
dynamics involved in the political decision-making process.  It is therefore often difficult 
s
nts of legislators.  Lobbyists understand this and therefore employ their 
m rship as both information sources and communicators of the group’s message.  
Data from this 
as an information source.  Interviewees said members could explain how regulations or
laws were impl
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to isola e 
Limitations of the Study 
 Many of the potential limitations of this study are inherent to exploratory, 
qualitative research, and were noted in the methodology.  Lobbyists’ responses were 
diverse due to the open-ended nature of the interviews.  It was challenging for me to 
provide prompts where needed without influencing the interviewees’ replies.  In 
addition, not every interviewee interpreted each question the same, or as it was intended.  
I had to occasionally rephrase a question or ask for clarification in order to maintain 
consistency amongst responses.   
During interviews, some lobbyists gave answers to questions before or after that 
specific question was asked.  I then had to adjust questioning accordingly.  This made 
themes more difficult to identify for data analyzing and reporting purposes.  
 This study asked lobbyists to explain and articulate the process of how and why 
they choose information sources in their research.  For most of the interviewees, this 
process is intuitive based on their personal judgment of each situation.  It was 
challenging for many of them to articulate their information finding strategy.  This factor 
combined with the open-ended nature of the questions, provided for a potentially 
unlimited number and variety of responses.  However, I believe there is validity to the 
data because of 1) the similarities amongst interviewee responses, and 2) the fact that 
these responses were what lobbyists thought of first.   
te a single variable for study.  I believe this study’s findings are relevant to th
ongoing discussion regarding the role of information sources and interest groups in the 
political decision-making process. 
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Recommendations for Further Research 
 Interest groups in the political decision-making process have been studied in a 
variety of ways.  Their interactions with the political process are dynamic and include 
many potential variables of study.  As Baumgartner and Leech (1998) stated, 
groups are a difficult set of institutions to study in a systematic way because their 
th, 
however, that makes it important for political science to pay more attention to 
st 
be basic to the study of politics as well. (p.188) 
The data from this research could potentially be used to study other dynamics regarding 
the role of information sources or how lobbyists influence legislators in the political 
decision-making process. 
 Because this was an exploratory study, I recommend that similar studies be 
conducted to verify the results.  As mentioned in the limitations, there are potentially 
numerous information sources, and many other responses to the questions asked in this 
study.  Future similar studies would help substantiate this research. 
 There are some specific topics within this field that warrant further research.  
Both previous research and this study’s data reveal the integral role of personal 
relationships and contacts for lobbyists in the political decision-making process.  The 
interview instrument for this study did not specifically mention “relationships” or 
“contacts,” yet they were discussed by every lobbyist.  Further research could be 
conducted on the various uses and roles of contacts at different stages in the process or 
for different purposes. 
activities are so varied and their implications so broad.  It is this very bread
groups.  Group interests are basic to the practice of politics; interest groups mu
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 Data from this s ion sources, for 
 
 
lobbyis
intervie n information source.  As noted 
h is 
egislators were not mentioned as an information source and 
uld 
 environment on 
er states 
c 
 
 
an effort to contribute to interest group theory.     
 
tudy noted the use of coalitions as informat
networking, and in coordinating efforts or campaigns.  Agricultural interest groups 
clearly participate in and depend on coalitions.  Coalition dynamics and purposes merit
future research. 
Previous research, specifically regarding transactional theory, suggests that 
ts and legislators exchange information on a regular basis.  However, only one 
wee in this study identified elected officials as a
in the findings, this could be because legislators are less available now, or because 
interviewees were not prompted with legislators as a possible source.  Further researc
needed to determine why l
whether or not they are an information source.  Legislators as information sources co
also be compared to other information sources in terms of how and when they are 
utilized. 
 Finally, these data reflect the impact of California’s political
interviewee responses.  Additional research in other states would provide meaningful 
studies for comparison across states.  How are agricultural interest groups in oth
affected by their respective state governments and political climates?  
How and why lobbyists influence legislators is a very complex and dynami
process.  There are any number of variables that impact the different stages of this
communication process.  These variables should be continuously studied and compared
to previous research in 
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APPENDIX A  
RUMENT - INTERVIEW GUIDE 
  
?  
ns, 
ests, or ?) 
le 
uch as educational/research 
4. 
ons that make them easier to contact or from which 
 to find it? 
7. research plays in 
g 
 
 
INST
 
 
1. What are the principal agricultural issues that your organization addresses?
Are you in general defending them or asking for new protection?  Please 
explain. 
2. For what purpose(s) are you most commonly researching any given issue
(i.e. for lobbying/political purposes, public education/awareness campaig
responding to member requ
3. What sources do you use to gain information needed in your research?  
Which sources do you use most often?  Why these among all your possib
choices? (provide a list of potential sources – s
institutions, governmental agencies, members of your organization, other 
interest groups or organizations, etc.) 
Are there certain characteristics or features of these favored or most utilized 
individuals or organizati
to gain information?  Is trust a factor?  Please explain. 
5. If you need information on a given issue, how do you decide whom to contact 
in order
6. As a representative of an organization that could be seen as an agricultural 
interest group, you are primarily presenting one side of most issues, correct?  
How, if at all, does this affect what information sources you use? 
Could you summarize by explaining the importance that 
your public affairs work – first, in influencing you and, second, in influencin
others?  Who are you most trying to influence?  Why? 
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APPENDIX B 
 
LIST OF POS RVIEWEES 
 
 
• gov gencies 
aca
• the
• priv
leg
• pop
• ext
• col
oth
pro
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gen
• me
adv
• acti
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oth
 
 
SIBLE SOURCES PROVIDED TO INTE
 
Possible Sources of Information 
ernment a
• demic/research institutions 
 Internet (specific websites? or general search? or?) 
ate consultants 
• al consultants 
ular press/media 
ension specialists/farm advisors 
leagues 
• er trade associations, interest groups, or organizations 
• fessional or scientific journals 
rketing orders 
• eral public 
mbers of your organization 
• isory committees (internal? or external? from where?) 
vist groups, opposing groups, or groups introducing claims or legislation that 
r organization disagrees with 
• ers? 
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APPENDIX C 
 
LETTER REQUESTING INTERVIEWEE PARTICIPATION 
 
Dear _____________: 
 
obtained my Bachelor of Science in Agricultural Education from the University of 
California, Davis in June of 2003.  I am currently pursuing my Master of Education in 
Ag tion at Texas A&M University.  My thesis 
rese c alifornia agricultural 
inte t ected interest groups that are affiliated with the top 10 
com o fornia.  Please see the attached paper for details regarding the 
specific purpose, objectives, and background of my thesis project. 
 
In a i ion of Rural Health and Safety Director for 
the l .  This has not affected 
my gh Texas A&M.   
 
My s f interviewing the primary lobbyist or governmental relations 
officer with each of the California agricultural interest groups I’ve identified.  Would 
you r ticipate in an interview for my thesis research?  
As e portant part of my 
targ s
more th chedule so we can identify a time that works 
bes e interview will take about 1 hour, and I have also enclosed a copy of 
e interview questions and a copy of my Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval.   
lease contact me as to whether or not you will be able to participate in my thesis 
roject.  I have enclosed my business contact information, which is now the best way to 
ontact me.  Thank you in advance for your time and support.   
espectfully, 
lisa Noble 
nclosures: Thesis Purpose and Objectives 
 Interview Questions 
 IRB Approval Memo 
 Graduate Committee Members 
 
 
I 
ricultural Policy/Agricultural Educa
ar h is titled “sources of information utilized by selected C
res  groups.”  I have sel
lim dities grown in Ca
dd tion, on July 19th I accepted the posit
 Ca ifornia Farm Bureau Federation and moved to Sacramento
 research, and I will still be obtaining my Masters degree throu
 re earch will consist o
r p imary lobbyist be willing to par
a r presentative of the dairy industry, your organization is an im
et ample.  The interviews will take place between November and January.  I am 
an willing to accommodate your s
t for you.  Th
th
 
P
p
c
 
R
 
 
E
 
E
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APPENDIX D 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
I have been asked to participate in a qualitative research study regarding the sources of 
formation utilized by selected California agricultural interest group.  This is study is a 
e 
 
t I can request the 
terview not be audio taped without risk to myself or the integrity of the study.  
I 
roceedings after they have been typed, in order to confirm my responses to the 
 
all 113 on the Texas A&M University campus, and destroyed after two years. 
ted problems or 
uestions regarding subjects’ rights, I can contact the Institutional Review Board 
ichael W. Buckley, Director of Research Compliance, Office of Vice 
resident for Research at (979) 845-8585 or mwbuckley@tamu.edu
in
thesis project for Elisa Noble, a graduate assistant in the Agricultural Education 
Department at Texas A&M University.  As the primary lobbyist or representative of on
such interest group, I have been asked to participate in this study.  A total of 15-20
participants are involved in this study.   
 
If I agree to be in this study, I will be asked to participate in an interview.  The interview 
will be audio taped, unless I request that it not be.  I understand tha
in
Participation in this study is voluntary, and I may withdraw from the study at any time.  
may also refuse to answer any questions that make me uncomfortable.  The interview 
itself will require one to two hours.  I will also be asked to review the interview 
p
interview questions.  I understand that there are no risks, benefits, or compensation 
associated with this study. 
 
This study is confidential and all records of this study will be kept private.  The 
researchers will use the same interview guide when interviewing all participants.  No 
personal identification will be placed on the results in order to ensure confidentiality.  
All results will be coded and only group data will be reported in the findings.  Research
records, including interview audiotapes and all data, will be stored securely in Scoates 
H
 
This research study has been reviewed by the Institutional Review Board – Human 
Subjects in Research, Texas A&M University.  For research-rela
q
through Dr. M
P . 
 Elisa Noble ((916) 561-5598 or enoble@aged.tamu.edu
 
I can contact ) or Dr. Gary Briers 
979)-862-3000 or g-briers@tamu.edu) with any questions regarding this study.  I have 
ions and have received answers to my 
is consent document for my records.  By 
te in this study. 
Signature:________________________________________ Date:_____________ 
 
((
read the above information.  I have asked quest
satisfaction.  I have been given a copy of th
signing this document, I consent to participa
 
 
  
 123
C
I voluntarily agree to be audio ta
Noble.  I understand that the tap ata analysis by Elisa Noble.  
 
_________________ Date:_____________ 
tudy. 
____ 
______ 
 
 
onsent to be Taped1 
 
ped during the experiment being conducted by Elisa 
es will be us d only for de
These tapes will be identified by codes so as to ensure confidentiality.  The tapes will be
kept for no more than two years, and they will be stored securely in Scoates 113, Texas 
A&M University campus.  The tapes will be erased after data is collected 
 
Signature of Subject__________________________________ Date:_____________ 
 
ignature of Subject_________________S
 
 
 
Refusal to be Taped 
 
I do not agree to be audio taped during this experiment conducted by Elisa Noble.  By 
refusing to be audio taped, I understand that I may continue to participate in the s
 
Signature of Subject__________________________________ Date:_________
 
Signature of Subject__________________________________ Date:_______
 
 
 
 
 
1Consent must be obtained during the debriefing. 
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alifornia, Davis in June 2003.  She began her graduate school program in the 
epartment of Agricultural Education at Texas A&M University in August 2003.  Ms. 
oble accepted a position with the California Farm Bureau Federation in July 2004, 
hile continuing work on her graduate degree.  She is the Rural Health and Safety 
Director and Agricultural Crime Prevention Coordinator for this farmer-member 
n 
ducation and agricultural policy. 
Ms. Noble may be reached at the California Farm Bureau Federation, 2300 River 
ddress is enoble@cfbf.com. 
 
 
 Elisa Lynn Noble received her Bachelor of Science degree in Agricultural 
Systems and the Environment, with a minor in Animal Science, from the University of 
C
D
N
w
agricultural trade association in California.  Ms. Noble received her Master of Science i
Agricultural Education from Texas A&M University in August 2005.  Her educational, 
research, and professional interests continue to be in the general fields of agricultural 
e
 
Plaza Drive, Sacramento, CA 95833.  Her e-mail a
 
  
